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INTRODUCTION
This study attempts to provide a thorough analysis of the economic
sectors that affect Turkey's growth and development process. The analysis
is carried out in two major sections. What divides the line between these
two sections is the implementation of a new economic stabilization
program. This stabilization program is implemented in an attempt to
establish a balance on both domestic and foreign economic affairs. Hainly
though, it is the stabilization of the domestic price level, and the
reduction or the elimination of the current account deficit of the
balance of payments. This program underlined the starting of a new era in
the Turkish economy. The the main philosophy behind the new era was to
depart from a regulated, controlled, and closed economy to one where
market forces and foreign competition could play major roles.
The first section covers the socio-economic growth and development
patterns of Turkey since the establishment of the Republic. It examines
the factors that contribute to its population growth, employment
policies, and educational system. Also a brief analysis is provided which
compares Turkey with other middle income countries on the basis of
selected social indicators.
The second chapter analyzes the stages of economic development, ana
the role of government in the development of the economy. The
establishment of the State Economic Enterprises is realized within the
theoretical framework of " etatism ", where the main idea behind this
movement was that government owned enterprises should provide the
necessary stimilus to economic growth and development. The discussion of
the performance and the problems of SEEs is also provided along with some
recommendations that may be taken into consideration in the future by
policymakers. Lastly, it analyzes the development plan period (1960-
onwards), and the circumstances that have led to the implementation of
the economic stabilization package of 1980.
The second section looks at the era of economic stabilization. The
effects of the measures taken can clearly be observed, especially on the
dynamics of inflation. The tests in an attempt to find the relationship
between money supply and prices in Turkey are conducted via monetarist
models. This is due to the fact that not only various analysts have based
their inflation studies in developing countries on monetarist models, but
also their results, including for Turkey, show that there is almost one
to one correspondance between the growth of the money supply and the rate
of inflation.
The success of the naive monetarist model in explaining the rate of
inflation in Turkey has led to a crude form of monetarism, where policy
prescriptions are based primarily on the control of the money supply.
Thus, the implementation of the strict monetary policies has yielded very
positive, beneficial results in reducing the rate of inflation in Turkey.
Turkey followed a inward oriented pattern of industrialization until
1980. The inefficiencies, low productivity experienced in domestic
production -mostly due to non-competitive domestic market structure-, and
an overvalued exchange rate system led to a decline in the country's
economic growth rate, increased deficits of the public sector, financed
mostly through the Central Bank, causing a rise in the rate of inflation,
and the elimination of the incentives to export, thus causing
inefficiencies in domestic resource allocation. Also the delayed
adjustment policies to external shocks of 1 973-1 974 created further
problems.
Following the 1980 Stabilization Package structural changes in the
Foreign Trade Regime have been observed. The liberalization of the Import
Regime, daily adjusted, more realistic exchange rate system, and
increased incentives for exports are some of these structural changes.
This section also examines the relationship between exports and economic
growth, and the effects of foreign capital inflows and foreign aid on
economic growth. Empirical tests conducted in this section also help us
to draw conclusions on the effects of the above mentioned variables on
economic growth.
PART ONE
SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND
DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS
CHAPTER I
MAJOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SECTORS
1
.
Introduction
This chapter provides a summary description of the social and
economic sectors which affect the country's growth and development
process. It examines the factors that contribute to its population
growth, employment policies, and educational system. The final section
compares Turkey with other middle income countries on the basis of their
selected social indicators.
2. Population Trends
Following the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the first census
was conducted in 1927, followed by a second census in 1935. Since then
censuses have been repeated at five year intervals. Unfortunately,
census results previous to 1935 have to be treated with some caution,
although the censuses taken since 1935 can be regarded as reasonably
accurate. ( In particular the 1927 census almost certainly under-
numerated the population, and probably accounts for the apparently high
1
growth rate for 1927-1935).
Between 1927 and 1950 the Turkish population increased about 2
percent per year, but improvement in health practices and the resulting
decline in mortality brought the annual rate for 1950-1960 up to 2.9
2
percent. Yet, the growth in population is somewhat understated since
Turkish censuses exclude Turks living abroad.
TABLE 1
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF POPULATION GROWTH
1927-35 to 1960-65
( in percent )
total(a) urban rural
1927-35
1935-40
1940-45
1 945-50
1950-55
1955-60
1960-65
2.2 2.1 2.2
1.9 2.9 1.6
1.1 0.9 1.2
2.2 2.0 2.2
2.9 5.8 1.9
2.9 5.2 1.9
2.5 4.0 1.7
(a) When adjustment is made for the immigrants arriving
in the 1950-66 period (144,239) and in the 1955-60 period (138,806) and
for the outflow of Turkish workers to Western Europe in the 1960-65
period (approximately 200,000) the following rates of natural increase is
derived :
1950-66, 2.7 percent; 1955-60 period, 2.8 percent; 1960-65, 2.6 percent.
Source E.J.Cohn, Turkish Economic, Social .and Political Change
,
(New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 176.
Recognition that this high rate of increase consumed much of the
resources that would otherwise be used to raise both current consumption
and investment together with the humanitarian desire to improve material
health and child welfare led to the adoption of a new official policy of
encouraging voluntary family planning, which in fact was strongly
endorsed by the First Five Year Development Plan.
Trends in Fertility and Mortality Rate
The Turkish transition from high birth and death rates
7was well advanced by the mid 1970's, but it was still far from reaching
the low levels of European countries. The State Planning Organization
(SPO ) has used the censuses to make rough estimates of birth and
mortality rate3 since 1935. These indicate a slowly rising annual birth
rate, from 38.3 per thousand in 1935-40 to 44 per thousand for 1960-70
combined with a fall in the death rate from 27.2 per thousand for 1940-45
3
to 14.5 per thousand for 1960-70.
During 1977-78, life expectancy at birth averaged 61 years, the
infant mortality rate was approximately 126 deaths per thousand births,
the crude birth rate was 34.9 per thousand population, and the total
4
fertility rate was 4.3 per woman.
There are
, in fact, very sharp differences in fertility rates
between the western and less developed eastern regions, and with increa-
sing urbanization fertility rates can be expected to fall. " Fertility is
inversely correlated with literacy, so that the cohort of females with
the highest reproductive age will be progressively more educated. The
rate of decline will also depend upon the rate of urbanization, and the
kinds of employment opportunities offered to new migrants. Studies of
differential fertility in Turkey have shown that the fertility rate of
village-born women hardly change when they move to the cities unless
5
they also experience a change in their socio-economic status. "
The national decline in death rates reaches back to the early
1930 's. This trend over these 50 years is downward, except for a rise in
death rates during WW II. Although Turkey was not involved militarily,
the material conditions of life deteriorated, and there were a number of
serious epidemics, both of which explain the reversal of the trend.
The decline in mortality brought an increase in the growth rate to a
level averaging 2.8 percent per year during the 1950's. Falling fertility
and labor migration reduced the rate approximately 2.4 percent per year
in the early 1970's. Declining fertility initially lowers the death rate
through its effects on the age structure at the same time as it lowers
birth rates. The latter effect is the stronger one. The decline in-
fertility in Turkey has not only brought a modest reduction in the growth
rate, but has positioned the structure of the population for more decline
in the future.
Future Trends
The present population in Turkey is approximately 48.5 million. The
State Planning Organization (SPO) expects that by 1995 the urban
population will have increased to 75 percent of the total population so
that Turkey will have been transformed from a predominantly rural
country to a mainly urban country in less than half a century, a rapid
transformation by historical standards. The largest cities are expected
to grow much faster than the medium sized and smaller urban cities.
For purposes of long range planning, the SPO has made series of
alternative estimates of population growth to 1995 based on assumptions
of high, medium and low fertility rate3. These projections are shown in
table 2 below. Comparison of these estimates with the totals actually
reported in 1975 and 1980 censuses is complicated by the fact that the
projections took no account of emigration.
It seems that the actual population is closely associated with low
fertility rate3, which corresponds to annual average rise of 2.3 percent.
If this average annual rise is to stay constant, the population is
6
expected to double in 30.4 years.
TABLE 2
POPULATION PROJECTIONS 1970-1995
( in millions )
fertility 1970
(actual)
1975 1980 1985 1995 ave. annual
rise (%)
1970-1995
High 35.7 40.8 47.3 55.2 76.3 3.1
Medium 35.7 40.5 46.2 52.9 69.1 2.7
Low 35.7 40.2 45.2 50.7 62.8 2.3
Actual 35.7 40.2 45.2
Source : SPO, Third Five Year Development Plan 1973-77
Ankara, SPO, 1983) p. 647 table 2.1
Employment
Turkish development planning focuses primarily on rapid growth and
modernization through industrial development, mostly growth of
manufacturing industry, since this is regarded as the ultimate basis for
economic and social development.
The import substituting development strategy that was followed
channelled a relatively large part of investment to sectors with high
incremental capital-labor ratios. This trend became more pronounced with
the progress of import substitution into basic and intermediate goods
industries in the 1970's.
Some of the institutional policies that have caused factor price
distortions can be stated as follows:
(1) The policy of maintaining an over-valued domestic relative to
10
foreign currency has created a bias in favor of capital intensity. The
implicit subsidy on imported capital equipment provided by this policy
has increased capital-labor ratios.
(2) The policy of maintaining relatively low interest rate3 on
borrowing has also encouraged capital intensive investment. Although some
measures raised nominal interest rates significantly, given the rapid
increase in prices, real interest rates continued to be highly negative
until the mid 1980s.
(3) The over-valued domestic relative to foreign currency, and the
low interest rates compounded by direct subsidization of the price of
machinery have led to an enormous increase in mechanization in agri-
culture. The number of tractors increased from 41,000 in 1962 to 325,000
7
in 1978. There were 20,000 harvesting combines in use in 1977. Although
this had a positive impact on production, it had major implications for
displacement of labor in agricultural occupations.
(t) Industrial labor is highly organized in Turkey. Partly as a
result, the total cost of employing labor includes significant fringe
benefits as well as high wages and substantial social security
contributions. Consequently, the relative low capital costs resulting
from exchange rate and interest rate policies when set against relatively
high total labor costs strengthened the bias towards capital intensity.
(5) The re-orientation of development policies towards exports and
the measures that are being taken to implement them will inevitably have
an impact on the allocation of investment, and on employment growth.
However, the structural changes implied in a move towards an outward
oriented pattern of development will take time, and the major impact on
employment will probably be seen in the Fifth or later plan periods.
11
The State Institute of Statistics (SIS) defines the labor force as:"
persons at a specific age and older who were employed or unemployed
during the week prior to the census or survey." Employed is defined as "
persons who during the week prior to the census or survey, did work for
pay or profit, were unpaid family workers, or who had a job but
temporarily were not working." Another term that also needs to be defined
is unemployed, which is " persons who during the week prior to the census
8
or survey, did not work but looked for work.
The State Planning Organization estimates unemployment (open and
disguised) outside agriculture at 0.8 million or 14.5 percent of the non-
agricultural labor force. However, only around 4.9 percent of urban labor
force was recorded as unemployed in 1969. Nearly 42 percent of the
unemployed were between the ages 15 and 24 and over half belonged to two
9
occupational groups, " craftsman, repairman ", and " unclassified ".
(See table 3 for the projections of labor supply and demand outside the
agricultural sector).
4. Education
The educational system is a crucial constraint on political social
and economic development. The central role of education in producing
enlightened citizens able to govern themselves and train the manpower
possesing the diverse professional skill that an increasingly complex
industrializing society requires has become widely recognized in Turkey,
as elsewhere.
TABLE 3
PROJECTIONS OF LABOR SUPPLY AND DEMAND OUTSIDE AGRICULTURE
( Millions of laborers )
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ACTUAL
1965-70
TURKISH
1972-77
DEVELOPMENT
1977-86
STRATEGY
1986-95
supply of non-agricultural labor
2.1
0.2
2.3
0.6
1.0
0.4
2.0
5.0
0.6
5.6
1.3
3.4
0.0
4.7
Growth of civilian
labor force 2.0
Decrease in agricultural
labor(l)
Total additional supply 2.0
new demand for non-agricultural labor
5.0
1.8
6.8
Industry
Services
Emigration
Total additional demand
0.3
0.8
0.3
1.4
2.2
5.8
0.0
8.0
Change in Unemployment 0.6 0.3 0.9 -1.2
(1) Excluding changes in agricultural underemployment
Source : The Third Five Year Plan, SPO, Ankara 1972
The extension and improvement of the educational system has long been
one of Turkey's main social needs. Although rapid progress has been made
In various fields, from the reduction of illiteracy to a number of
personnel with technical qualities, the demand for education and for
skilled manpower is greater than the existing system can meet.
Since the establishment of the Republic, the scope of education was
broadened with the opening of additional schools at various levels, and
the expansion of university level education. Arab script was replaced in
1928 by a modified Latin alphabet, which greatly faciliated the spread of
literacy.
13
These, as well as other accomplishments show the seriousness of the
effort that successive Turkish governments have made to raise the
educational level. The magnitude of this effort is also reflected in the
increasing share of the budget, and the GNP allocated to the Ministry of
Education. These allocations rose from 11.0 percent to 13.0 percent and
10
from 1.5 percent to 2.9 percent respectively, between 1948 and 1968.
The formal educational system consists of three levels: basic,
secondary, and higher education. Basic education is divided into two
cycles; the first cycle consists of primary school for children 7 to 12
years of age. The second cycle consists of a additional three years of
middle school. In the following three years of secondary education,
students either attend a general lycee ( high school ) or go to technical
or vocational schools.
Since the universal primary education is a constitutional
requirement, the Second Development Plan had aimed at increasing primary
school attendence to 100 percent. Considerable progress has been made in
the last 20 to 25 years in extending primary education.
TABLE 4
LITERACY IN TURKEY.
( in percent of population over 6 years )
literacy level 1915 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Males 34.97 38.52 44.79 46.87 52.34 69.00 78.00
Females 13.70 16.55 20.59 22.56 26.85 40.00 55.00
Total 24039 27.59 32.89 34.93 39.84 54.50 67.93
Source : World Bank Country Study, Washington, D.C. March 1980
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TABLE 5
PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
( in thousands and in percent )
age group total students enrollment rate %
1955-1956 3,252 1,984 61.00
1960-1960 4,245 2,867 67.50
1965-1966 5,061 3,932 77.70
1970-1971 5,292 4,992 83.60
1977-1978 8,359 7,762 92.80
Source : World Bank Country Study, Washington, D.C. March 1980
The achievements of expanding the educational system so that more
and more Turks are not only able to attend school, but also have the
opportunity to pursue their studies to a higher level, even though
leaving much to be desired, would inspire greater confidence for Turkey's
future if the education dispensed were of a higher quality, and greater
relevance. The educational problems will not be solved by expanding the
present educational system so that it can produce more of the same.
The single most important problem that underline the weakness of
this system is that at all levels of education there is an emphasis on
memorization and copying almost totally neglecting analysis and problem
solving approach. What this approach of memorization and copying does not
do is to sharpen the mind as an analytical tool, develop evaluative
capabilities, or furnish guidance in dealing with the unfamiliar
situations for which no ready-made answer is provided, but that students
are going to face in real life in a rapidly changing world.
15
TABLE 6
ENROLLMENT RATIOS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF EDUCATION
( percent of relevant age group )
1973.74 1977-78
Basic Education: First stage (7-12) 90.0 92.0
Basic Education: Second stage (13-15) tt.3 50.7
General Lycee (High School) (16-18) 13.2 13.1
Technical & Vocational Schools
(16-18) 6.5 11.5
Higher Education 7.1 9.0
Source : World Bank Country Study, Washington, D.C. March 1980
5. A Brief Look At Social Indicators
A comparison of the level of selected social indicators in Turkey
and other middle income countries (see table 7) presents a rather
favorable picture. While the adult literacy rate in Turkey is
significantly below that of the average for middle income countries, life
expectancy at birth is around the average, and the ratio of physicians to
population much better. A relatively high proportion of the people have
access to safe water. Per capita supply of calories in Turkey is also
significantly higher than the average for middle income countries.
Therefore, it seems correct to conclude that on the whole, past growth
policies have provided Turkish people with a standard of living on par
with that enjoyed by the population of other large middle income
countries. ( Table 7 gives more detailed data on social indicators,
between the period 1960-1977 )
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TABLE 7
COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIAL INDICATORS
1960-1977
Adult Life Per capita Pop. Pop.w/ Daily per
Literacy Expect. energy per access capita
Rate At Birth consumption physician to safe calorie
( % ) (years) kg. coal. eq. (units) water supply
1975 1977 1976 1976 ( % ) 1974
Turkey 67 61 743 1720 75 2846
Argentina 93 71 1804 530 66 3408
Brazil 76 62 731 1650 77 2516
China, Rep. of 82 72 1797 1590 .
,
2780
Colombia 81 62 685 1820 64 2183
Egypt 44 54 473 1190 66 2637
Korea, Rep. of 91 63 1020 1680 62 2630
Mexico 76 65 1227 • • • • 62 2727
Peru 72 56 642 1580 47 2360
Philippines 87 60 329 3150 38 1971
Thailand 82 61 308 8460 22 2382
Yugoslavia 85 69 2016 790 •• 3462
Average for
55 MIC's
(Middle Income
Countries) 69 60 916 4470 59 2557
Source : World Development Report, IBRD, 1979.
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CHAPTER IX
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMY
1 . Evolution of Economic Policy
It was the 1923 Izmir Economics Congress which established the
foundations of government policies for the economy. Ataturk, the founder
of modern Turkey, adressed the Congress with the following lines :
"
...To propel our new Turkey forward to the level of
evolution in which she is worthy, we are obliged, whatever
happens, to put the economy first... However great may be
the political and military victories, the success achieved
cannot last unless it is crowned with economic victories,
and will soon vanish. " (1)
While the Congress was in progress, two policy issues were
debated at length. The first one was the role of government in the
development of the economy. It was made clear that the government was
ready to allow private enterprise the major role in industrial
development, and to limit the government intervention to basic public
utilities, and certain state monopolies which primarily had a fiscal
purpose.
The second one concerned the role of foreign capital in economic
development. It became clear that the state was to be responsible for
major infrastructure investments, especially the railways.
Apart from the railways, direct government investment was mainly
limited to the state monopolies. These had been established primarily to
raise revenue, and help to develop certain industries. It was not until
the late 1920's when the government shifted its economic philosophy from
19
a free enterprise orientation to a one called, " Etatism ". The main idea
behind this movement was that government owned enterprises should provide
the necessary stimulus to economic growth and development. This was
followed by the establishment of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in
the industrial field. Plans were made for the protection of infant
industries with emphasis being placed on the development of domestic
textile, chemical and iron industries through these state enterprises.
2. Birth of Etatism
The birth of Etatism, and perhaps the use of this concept as
an official policy was inevitable. There was relatively little government
intervention in the industry throughout the 1920's, yet the very slow
rate of increase per capita income during this period contributed to
general scepticism about the free enterprise system. By regaining rights
to impose taxes and tariffs ( also referred as Capitulations ), the
government increased its range of policy alternatives. The sharp decline
in export earnings due to the Great Depression also forced a shift in the
government's economic policies.
This shift was towards " Etatism ". Bernard Lewis defines etatism
as the intervention of the state as a pioneer and director of industrial
activity, in the interest of national development and security in a
2
country in which private enterprise is either suspect or ineffective.
Ataturk used the term etatism in the following context :
The completely demographic and populist programme
followed by our party is etatist from the economic
point of view. The government of our party is
interested in the life, the comfort and the future
of our citizens from every angle. Our people are
20
naturally etatist because they see it as their right
to demand from the state all sorts of remedies to
their problems. (3)
If the country's stagnant economic situation, continuous decline in
per capita income, and debt burden are taken into consideration one
cannot conclude that the government's intentions were to supersede
private enterprise. Goymen notes that numerous statements were made by
influential leaders in the early 1930's, emphasizing the basic and
predominant place of private enterprise in the Turkish economy, and
4
essentially temporary role of etatism. He also cites some of the
leaders' speeches in which they suggest that, whenever possible, the
state should join private capital, in industrial ventures, or, where this
was not possible, sell the shares owned by the state to • private
5
enterprise at an early opportunity and on easy terms.
According to Goymen, Turkey rejected the theory of international
division of labor on the basis of comparative advantage. The dichotomy
that it implied between industrial and agricultural countries, as in the
words of the then Ministry of Economy, would have forced Turkey " ..to
6
accept colonial status. " This may sound harsh, and extreme, yet we
should keep it in mind that this statement was made in reference to the
Lousanne Treaty, which severely restricted Turkey's rights to levy import
duties (capitulations).
The ideology during that time was that national sovereignty had to
be strengthened by economic sovereignity. It was, perhaps even today,
believed that to become truly viable a country had to rest on a strong
economy.
It was also during this period that the importance of planning was
emphasized. This has led to the announcement of a first five year plan in
21
1931. let, the plans implemented starting in 1 934 through 1960 were far
from being comprehensive. The first comprehensive development plan was
introduced in 1963 and thereon the period of planned economy started.
3. State Economic Enterprises (SEEs)
3.1. Birth of SEEs & Objectives
In the 1930's, when the first Turkish State Economic Enterprise was
established, there was hardly any industry in Turkey. The creation of a
state enterprise had therefore strong promotional and educational
objectives: ..to highlight the profits that would accrue to the country
from industrialization, to demonstrate the workings of modern industry,
and to recruit and train a pool of industrial staff and workers.
The Government began to invest heavily in industry, transportation,
and to some degree, in agriculture, trade and services. These investments
were carried out through state economic enterprises. Some of the SEE'
3
that were established in this period are listed below.
The first SEE, Sumerbank, was founded in 1933. Its original
functions included not only the creation of a number of factories, and
mines, but also participation in or financial support of private
ventures, training of workers and staff, and advice to the Ministry of
the Economy on measures to promote industry. It established paper and
textile mills, and provided the infrastructure needed for the
electrification of the country.
Another state economic enterprise, Etibank, was established in
1935, and some of the Sumerbank' s operations, such as development of
mining and power were transferred to this SEE. Etibank initiated copper
22
production in 1 938 , and then lignite and choromite mining at various
locations. It also was authorized to construct an aliminum smelter, a
project which was realized some forty years later, with aid from the
Soviet Union.
The Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi) was reorganized in 1924. It
acquired SEE status in 1937. Its main purpose was, and still is, to
finance agricultural projects at low interest rates, or subsidize them.
3.2. Performance and Problems of SEEs
A number of common problems have adversely affected the perform-
ance of all SEEs in varying degrees. These include excessive rigidity in
management and pricing due to government controls. Interference by
government, and frequent changes in management have made it difficult for
SEEs to introduce programs for improving productivity. Further, most of
the SEEs, particularly since the early 1970s have been bound by
government decisions to restrain prices despite cost increases, while a
few have enjoyed monopoly rights over competing imports enabling them to
charge higher prices. Political pressures have also constrained many
enterprises to keep redundant employees on their payrolls, while on the
other hand, low scales of public employment made it easy for the private
sector to attract away key managerial and technical staff. Some of these
problems arise from the government's use of SEEs to achieve various
social and political purposes, such as the development of backward
areas, the provision of maximum employment, and the sale of essential
goods and services at low prices. An explicit statement of the social and
general economic objectives of individual SEEs should be made, and
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specific subsidies be allocated to meet objectives to enable a clear
assessment and improvement of the operational efficiency of the State
Economic Enterprises.
It is clear that the public enterprise sector is a very important
factor in the Turkish economy. SEEs generate about 8 percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP), and provide around 10 percent of all non-
7
agricultural wage employment. Their investment constitutes about 40
percent of total public sector investment, and was nearly a quarter of
8
total fixed investment in 1977.
TABLE 8
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT OF SEEs (1)
(in billions of current TL)
1972 1975 1976 1977 1978
Expenditure 35.0 109.3 164.8 208.9 322.2
Wages and salaries 29.7 28.3 42.1 61.3 95.5
Other inputs 75.0 115.0 133.8 214.7
Depreciation and
other provisions 5.3 6.0 7.7 13.7 12.0
Income 36.5 104.9 147.9 172.7 268.7
Sales revenue 34.4 92.2 132.8 155.9 264.8
Increase in stocks 2.1 12.0 15.1 16.8 3.9
Gross Profit(+)/Loss(-) +1.5 -4.4 -16.9 -36.2 -53.5
( 1 ) Operational State Economic Enterprises
Source: TURKEY, World Bank Country Study, Washington, D.C. 1980, p. 65
As Table 8 also shows, the losses of SEEs have increased nearly
thirteenfold, from TL 4.4 billion in 1975 to TL 53.5 billion in 1978.
Such a poor financial performance reflected rapidly increasing costs in
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an inflationary situation, accompanied by efforts to keep their prices
unchanged, partly as an anti-inflationary measure.
SEEs are subject to a wide variety of interference and control from
different sources, not only on policy questions, but also on day to
day operations. The State Planning Organization (SPO), the council of
Ministers, the Ministry of Finance, and local governments, the various
Ministries dealing with economic issues, the political parties, and the
Parliament all effect SEE decisions. In particular, overstaffing problems
in the SEEs are traditionally traced to political pressures. It is
noteworthy that between 1970-77, labor employed in the SEEs increased at
an average rate of 11.1 percent per year. In the same period, industrial
employment increased at 4.3 percent per year. During the same period
administrative personnel employed in SEEs increased 4.5 percent per
9
year.
TABLE 9
PROFITS OF SELECTED SEEs IN MINING & MANUFACTURING 1960-1972
(in millions of TL 4 in percent)
profits ratio of
profits before taxes as a %
of net
equity
equity
to total
Average assets
Company 1960-62 1967 1967-72 1972 1972 1972
Turkish Coal Corp. -46 1 -77 -62 -6.2 0.39
Turkish Petroleum Corp. 66 152 283 385 19.1 0.51
Turkish Sugar Corp. 28 38 59 70 25.2 0.08
Sumerbank, Consolidated 63 167 111 209 8.0 0.51
Nitrogen Industry -24 -48 -30 20 2.5 0.44
PETKIM - -2 75 11.4 0.56
Turkish Cement 7 39 20 22 -0.8 0.63
Turkish Iron & Steel 73 102 277 455 17.7 0.43
Machinery & Chemicals 22 60 55 12 9.8 0.53
Pulp & Paper Consolidated 25 44 42 -54 -8.2 0.23
Source : B. Walstedt, SME in a Mixed Economy . J.H.Press, 1980, p. 111.
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TABLE 10
STATE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES
own resources available for meeting investment expenditures
TL million
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Sumerbank +599 -2,544 -4,404 -265 +2,483
Etibank -375 -8,368 -1,929 -4,243 +4,860
Coal Mines -7,489 -13,476 -11,747 -18,638 -20,697
Iron and Steel -4,620 -2,995 -4,729 -7,521 -618
Cement -472 -1,071 -857 +5,530 +5,457
Nitrogen Company -1,179 -1,110 -2,161 +988 -204
Chemicals -67 -2,514 -5,190 -3,988 +1,714
Paper +629 -1,649 -7,849 -508 -3,408
Petroleum +666 +766 +10,207 +30,118 +24,291
Sugar
-1,537 -5,744 +2,983 -822 -6,879
Turkish Airlines -21 -257 -2,138 -3,670 +24 ,406
Maritime Bank -1,081 -4,874 -4,286
-7,985 +166
Sea transports -518 -2,138 +34 +513 -698
Railways -3,212 -7,861 -18,705 -34,736 -33,589
PTT +1,191 -2,620 +2,574 +11,089 +13,541
Soil Products office +805 -4,382 +1,571 +2,612 +2,360
Meat and Fish -254 +275 +125 +1,142 +312
Petrol Office -84 -1,349 +877 +1 ,046 +163
Agricultural Equipment-2,082 -7,788 -6,486 -77,624 -53,082
Milk Industry -146 -159 -242 -366 +376
Tourism Bank -156 -734 -532 - -
Radio-Television +489 -5 -96 +369 +1,102
Petro-Chemicals +1,417 +3,272 +8,969 +6,100 +7,057
Others +2,596 +8,421 +50,190 +58,035 +56,745
TOTAL PRODUCTIVE SEE '-15,301 -58,814 +6,084 -43,194 +25 ,858
Provincial Bank - - - - -
Agricultural Bank +87 -1,655 +142 - -
Real Estate Bank -49 -150 +256 - -
Religious Found. Bank - - - - -
Social Security Fund +113 +239 +696 - -
Pension Fund +131 +123 +256 - -
State Investment Bank - -1,148 -417 - -
Others -71 -520 -2,612 - -
TOTAL OF FINAN. SEE'S +211
OVERALL TOTAL -15,090
-3,121 -1,679
-61,935 +4,404 -43,194 +25,858
Source : TDRKEY . OECD Economic Surveys, 1982/83, April 1983, p. 71.
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Although SEEs were of crucial Importance to the economic
development of Turkey, its performance so far, nevertheless raises
serious questions to its ability to fuction well, and the degree of
emphasis it should be given in the future. Some of their
more significant weaknesses can be summarized as follows:
(a) industrial development was pulled excessively in the direction
of capital intensive import substitution.
(b) a self-perpetuating power group was born, linking bureaucrats,
labor unions, and local politicians, that was far more powerful than any
private capitalist power blocs operating in Turkey.
(c) The dualism between the state and private sectors introduced
inflexibilities rather than mutually supportive structures capable of
evolution and adoptation.
(d) The prices of the SEE products were set by the government, and
were not allowed to be determined by the supply and demand in the
marketplace.
(e) The State Economic Enterprises were neither well administered
nor well managed, mainly due to the reasons listed below:
The administration of SEEs has been studied countless times by
Turkish and foreign experts. The subject has been analyzed and discussed
in all five year plans, and the annual reports of the Parliament, and in
academic circles. Some of the most common problems are :
1. Ambiguity of objectives : The State Planning Organization (SPO)
has a central responsibility for the formulation of objectives and
investment programs for industrialization. These do not always rest on a
solid foundation of technical and economic studies, and the projects are
often politically inspired.
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2. Political interference : The areas that the political
j
interference can clearly be seen are collective bargaining and wage
policy, price policy, and investment decisions, i.e., project location,
choice of technology. Frequent changes in top management are also related
to politics; when the political majority changes there is a wholesale
replacement of top management. [According to one cabinet member, 90
percent of the top level managers of state enterprises were changed in
1978, when the power shifted from the Demirel to the Ecevit government.
According to this official, the minority parties in particular have used
10
management positions in SEEs as a channel for political propoganda. ]
3. Lack of direction and coordination at the top: there was no top
organization to coordinate investments by various public agencies and
settle priorities efficiently. Every SEE is subject to controls at four
levels : The Ministry of Finance, the responsible Ministry (i.e., a SEE
producing petroleum, petrochemicals, .. .is controlled by Ministry of
Energy and Natural Resources), the State Planning Organization (SPO), and
the High Control Board (HCB). Clearly, such splitting of
responsibilities, and controls hamper the productivity and efficiency of
these enterprises.
4. Lack of proper staff incentives: This applies particularly to top
and middle management, and lack of incentive is frequently mentioned as
the root cause of low efficiency in state enterprises. The principal
handicaps are lower pay than the private sector, insecurity of tenure in
the higher positions, and long delays before important decisions can be
reached.
Since many of the above weaknesses have long been recognized why
corrective actions have not been taken is a puzzling question. It is fair
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to add, however, that several of the problems encountered are also
characteristics of the operation of state economic enterprises in some
11
highly developed economies.
TABLE 11
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE OPERATIONAL
STATE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES
( TL Billion )
1979 1980 1981 1982
Sales Revenue 430 1,146 1,767 2,480
Total Expenditure 501 1,169 1,759 2,446
Wages and Salaries 143 238 314 378
Purchase of goods and Services 336 898 1,390 1,986
Depreciation 16 23 28 64
Other 6 10 27 18
Profit (or loss-) before taxes -71 -23 8 34
Taxes - 4 -15 -42 -60
Net Resources Available
-75 -38 -34 -26
Total Investment 172 459 616 633
Fixed Capital Investment 128 281 406 508
Stock Changes 44 178 210 125
Overall Financial Requirement 247 497 650 659
Financed by
Depreciation 16 24 28 64
Budget Transfers 83 149 241 242
Central Bank credits 54 50 32 26
State Investment Bank 14 16 16 12
Foreign Borrowing (net) 62 67 97 64
Short term borrowing 18 191 236 251
Source : OECD Economic Surveys 1982-83 TURKEY, p. 34
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3.3. Conclusions
The recent years have seen the proposals of alternative reform
programs. The suggestions in these programs, in principle, address issues
such as :
(a) autonomy of enterprise protected against political interference;
this in turn 13 a condition of full accountability on the part of
management
;
(b) reliance of the market mechanism supplemented by infant industry
incentives;
(o) full accounting to the nation regarding operating performance,
and financial and economic results in the state sector;
(d) elimination of dualism between private and public sectors.
This section can be concluded by indicating the essential condi-
tions for a solution to the problems of the State Economic Enterprises
mentioned above :
1
.
Measures must be developed and wherever possible, published- that
will show the productivities and economic efficiencies of all state
holdings, enterprises, plants, and work places.
2. Plants in which substantial overemployment exist must be banned from
hiring additional personnel to replace those that leave.
3. Uneconomic plants should be closed. No SEE should be allowed to cite
a social service function, such as retaining redundant workers on its
payroll, as a reason for poor financial performance.
4. The pay scale and working conditions of workers and
professional staff in SEEs should be competitive to those in the private
sector.
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The present government has taken some serious steps to eliminate
3ome of the major problems that are discussed in this section. These are
rather encouraging, and represent a radical departure from past practice.
Since 1980, central government intervention has diminished and govern-
mental transfers have decreased. The managers of most SEEs have been given
responsibility for setting market oriented prices. Managers have been
encouraged to implement necessary price increases without delay, and to
reflect the co3t of imports in their retail prices. Certain commodities
which remain subject to price controls, such as coal, electricity,
transportation and petroleum products, have been permitted substantial
price increases. In addition to these, managerial salaries have been
raised, and limits have been placed on new hiring.
The most important changes that have led to increased SEE profits
have been higher prices for their products, and also closely related,
tighter limits on their access to low interest bearing loans from the
Treasury. The implementation of a more realistic pricing system following
the pruning of subsidies for the products of State Economic Enterprises
helped to curb Central Bank credits which had become one of the major
sources of inflation. Most of the price controls imposed on SEE products
were lifted to ensure the better functioning of the market mechanism.
Most of the subsidies were abolished to allow market forces to play a
greater role in resource allocation. Also, the changes in their
organizational structure, and the provision of various pay incentives to
top and middle level management helped to raise SEE productivity.
The first results of these new policies became apparant in
the improved financial performance of the SEEs in 1981 and 1982. Table 12
presents the operating performance of the non-financial SEEs for the
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periods indicated. Yet, the future effectiveness of these implemented
policies can only be evaluated assuming that the political environment in
Turkey remains stable. It is a very hard task to try to predict the
outcome, and speculate the expected results of these policies in the
years to come since political instability has been the single most
important factor that has caused Turkey to experience the economic crises
of the late 1970s, and early 1980.
TABLE 12
OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF THE NON-FINANCIAL SEEs
(billions of Turkish Liras)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Net operating
income 1033(1)
Unprofitables SEEs (19.4) (17.5) (15.4) (23.7) (18.0) (15.5)
Profitable SEEs 6.2 20.7 67.5 142.0 157.8 192.4
[-13.2] [3.1] [52.0][118.3][138.8][176.9]
Less Government
transfers 40.3 74.1 74.1 110.6 91.5 109.4
Net operating income
( loss ) (53.5) (71.0M23.1) 7.7 48.3 67.5
( 1) before taxes
Source : Turkey, Kohn Leob Lehman Brothers, 1983
4.The State Planning Organization (SP0)
The State Planning Organization (SP0) was established by a "special
law" in 1960, which stated that " economic, social, and cultural
development should be based on a plan, and this plan should be carried
out through the SPO ". It was widely believed, and still is, that
"...planning is a principal means of escaping the stigma of underdevelop-
12
ment."
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The institutional structure of the State Planning Organization
was designed to create a degree of independence and security for the
technical experts who were to prepare plans, and the political author-
ities. Given the functions of this organization below, it was believed
that the Turkish Development Plans for the post-1960 era would represent
an important advance on the pre-war industrialization plans, which had
affected only one sector of the economy, and were based on very
simplistic methodological principles.
The law concerning the establishment of the SPO has set the
13
functions of this Organization as follows :
a) to assist the government in determining economic and social
objectives and policies, through compilation and evaluation of exhaustive
data on all types of natural, human, and economic resources and poten-
tials in the country;
b) to make recommendation to and act in a consultative capacity
for the ministries, with a view to 3ecure the coordination of minister-
ial activities relating to economic policy;
c) to prepare short, and long term plans for the realization of
the objectives to be adopted by the government;
d) to advise on the improvement of the organization, and function-
ing of government offices and agencies as well as of local administra-
tions concerned to assure successful execution of plans;
e) to follow up the implementation of the plans, evaluate it, and
make revisions, where necessary;
f) to propose measures which will encourage and regulate the act-
ivities of the private sector in harmony with the goals and objectives of
the plans.
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5. Pre- 1960 Period
The growth and development process of Turkey should be analyzed in
two time periods; one pre-1960 period, and the other one being post-1960
period, since the latter period pursues the development strategy of the
country in a less distruptive way than in the pre-1960 period. Economic
planning was made a requirement in the 1960 Constitution, and was
introduced in the form of a national development plan.
At this point, a brief analysis of the pre-1960 period is necessary
before we start looking at the planned economy period.
Per capita GNP increased to $165 in 1950 from $105 in 1927, in
14
current dollars. Modern Industries, both public and private were
established. Agricultural sector production increased gradually, due
mostly to expansion of land under cultivation. However, the increase in
cultivated land, and the lack of adequate communications between rural
districts and cities limited rural-urban migration.
The policies lmplented between 1923 through 1960 brought unbalanced
growth; with most of the growth being concentrated in the west of the
country. Only a small portion of the population benefited from the
increases in urbanization, and the standard of living of the rural
population detoriated in the 1930s and 1940s. Yet, the 1950s marked an
improve-ment in the distribution of agricultural products and in the
share of the industry, due to a large scale construction to build the
country's infrastructure, especially the highway network system.
Governments started to implement more liberal policies towards
the private sector. In 1958 and 1959. following a trade boom, bottlenecks
started to appear in the economy, since trade boom and bottlenecks are
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concomitant with rapid growth; capital, which was already scarce, became
even scarcer, the volume of exports and imports decreased, large
government sector expenditures financed by borrowing from the Central
Bank led to high rates of inflation. Price controls were imposed, and
serious balance of payments deficits led to a stabilization program.
Turkish lira (TL) was devaluated to ease the pressures on the export
sector, and the foreign trade difficulties.
The devaluation of 1959 (around 110 percent from the 1957 level) did
help to increase the volume of exports in that year, and with no major
changes in the volume of imports, a reduction in the current account
deficit was observed. Along with these, rescheduling of the repayments of
Turkey's consolidated debt was agreed by the OECD countries at a
concessionary interest rate (3 percent). Although temporary, this gave
the government sufficient breathing space to increase import quotas,
especially for goods essential for the development of the economy.
6. The Development Plan Period
6.1. Planning Objectives and Techniques
Each of Turkey's four Five-Year Development plans (and also
the Fifth one which has started in early 1984 ) included more or less
lengthy statements about its objectives. These statements were not
always identical, but they have been nevertheless reasonably consistent
in choosing a number of similar basic goals. These can be outlined brief-
ly under five points.
The realization of high and sustained growth of national
income has invariably the primary ofjective of planning. It was recogniz-
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ed that the economy has attained a new dynamism during the 1950s. Also,
it was believed that the annual GNP growth could be raised to 7 percent
in real terms (the target of the first and the second plans) if the use
of resources was planned in an effective, productive fashion.
Secondly, the planners bore in mind the severe balance of payments
difficulties which Turkey had experienced during the late 1950s and made
their elimination one of their objectives. The Fourth Plan, in part-
icular, appeared to put more emphasis on the achievement of this goal
than the earlier ones.
The creation of additional employment has been the third stated
objective of the plans. Its importance obviously derives from the rapid
growth of the population, and in particular, the demographic bulge of
young adults who came into the labor market during the 1970s.
Fourthly, all four plans have included the achievement of a greater
degree of social justice as one of their aims. The extension of social
services and social security to all parts of the country and to all
sections of the society have been accepted as an important target. Reform
of the tax system, so as to shift a higher proportion of the tax burden
14
onto the shoulders of the wealthy was urged in the First Plan, and
repeated in the following ones.
The final and the related goal is the gradual elimination of
regional disparities in income, education, and industrialization in
particular, the direction of special development efforts to central,
eastern, and south-eastern Turkey. Thi3 is perhaps the only goal in which
all of the plans have emphasized as one of their major goals, yet have
done nothing about it. In this respect the Plans are rather similar to
the industrialization plans of the pre-war years.
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Given these objectives, the planners have had to prepare detailed
proposals for their achievement, with targets for the aggregate growth of
national income over each plan period. These growth rates were planned to
be attained through various "instrument variables" such as monetary,
15
fiscal, and exchange rate policies. In summary, the planning process
included three stages : a macro-economic stage, a sector stage, and the
project stage. In the first of these, estimates were based on a Harrod-
Domar growth model, which, after assuming a given target GNP growth rate
and the marginal capital-output ratio, indicated the required volume of
investment. The planners then estimated a plausible rate of domestic
savings, and by subtracting this from the required investment, calculated
the foreign capital requirement. The required level of public sector
investment was similarly calculated as total investment minus expected
private investment. An example can be constructed in regard to First Plan
Targets :
Target GNP Marginal Total Expected Foreign
growth rate X capital investment domestic + capital
(per cent output (savings) savings requirement
per year) ratio requirement
7.0 2.59 18.2 15.0 3.2
Having established the aggregate planned levels of output and
investment, the SPO then determined their distribution between
different sectors by means of a sectoral input-output table, giving total
value added within each sector plus inputs from other sectors which
would be required to reach a given level of output. The marginal capital-
output ratio for each sector was then used to calculate the required
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volume of investment. For the First Plan a 15 sector table was prepared
;
by the time the Third Plan was being worked out, this had been extended
to 37 sectors with 2t Industrial subsectors. Finally, projects which
would meet the sectoral targets established by the second stage were
evaluated. In practice, each of these stages in the planning procedure
involved constant trial and error; results from the sector stage were
used to correct those of the macro-economic stage, and results of the
16
project stage to correct those of both the earlier stages.
6.2. First & Second Plan Periods ( 1963-67 & 1968-72)
The First Five Year Plan was prepared in accordance with the method
of planning in stages developed by Prof. J. Tinbergen. In this method, as
was mentioned in the previous section, the economy is analyzed in three
inter-related stages.
In the first stage magnitudes such as aggregate income, consump-
tion, savings, investment, imports, and exports, which cover the whole
economy, and the relationships among them, are studied. The aim is to
draw up various development policies that seem appropriate for the
economy, and to prepare the way for a selection among them. This is done
by technical studies which specify the development targets on the one
hand, and diagnose the factors limiting development on the other.
In the second stage, the conditions required for realizing the
development targets defined in the first stage without causing an
imbalance among various commodities should be investigated. Sectoral
growth rates and investments are determined in this section. It is also
in this stage where the first Input-Output table for the economy was
drawn up. At this point of our analysis it is necessary to provide some
38
explanation as to how the Table was constructed. The following four
17paragraphs are drawn on the studies of Jan Tinbergen and Y. Kucuk.
In the preparatory period prior to the first Plan, the problem of
setting up balanced sectoral programs was among the most important policy
decisions awaiting a solution, since during the pre-plan years, the
bottlenecks in some sectors(cement, iron, steel) and the overproduction
in certain others (textiles, transportation) had constituted serious
problems.
First, the year 1959 was selected as the base year of the model.
There are a number of reasons for this choice: the preparations for the
Plan had started towards the end of 1 96 1 , the year 1 958 had suffered from
a 65 percent devaluation, and the year 1960 experienced a military coup
(coup d'etat). Thus, it became necessary to choose 1959, a relatively
normal year, as the base year. Then, Tinbergen proposed some simplifying
assumptions for the 1-0 Table, recommending some cells be left empty. (see
1-0 Table for Turkey, Table 13)
The Table was constructed and filled for 20 sectors. The information
for the construction of this Table was gathered by the State Planning
Organization as a basis for sectoral programs. A decision was made as to
what the Inputs of a sector could be, and then the values were given
accordingly. Most of the available data indicated quantities without any
money values, and were evaluated according to the retail prices of a
given city. This is the justification for the claim that the Table was
prepared on the basis of buyers' prices.
The Table did have many shortcomings, such as the lack of
independent consumption data. For this reason, to prepare it for the
usage it was reduced by one fourth, to cover only fifteen sectors. It is
39
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clear that this is in principle inconsistent with the input-output model,
which is an empirical general equilibrium model.
In the first two stages the problem of consistency is the most
important. Attention is focused on the achievement of various balances.
In the third stage the search for efficiency comes into the picture.
When a selection is made among various projects, possibilities of using
the scarcest factor in the most productive way are investigated.
The First Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP) was essentially
planned within the framework described above. Along with the three stages
it was designed to develop three models or techniques which consist of a
growth model with one sector, an input-output model, and a method for
project evaluation. A Harrod-Domar type macro-model, an open and static
input-output model for 1959 with 15 industries, assuming some input
coefficients be zero, and a project evaluation technique based on social
profitability were taken as technical framework of the study.
The principal development target fixed by the First Plan was a 7
percent yearly increase in GNP. In order to attain this target the Plan
envisaged devoting 18.3 percent of GNP to investments. The State Planning
Organization estimated the value of incremental capital-output ratio
18
(ICOR), for this Plan period as 2.6. Therefore, in order to realize
an average development rate of 7 percent it was accepted that 18.2
19
percent, [7x2.6] of GNP had to be devoted to capital formation. With
foreign aid about 4 percent of national income, savings had to be brought
20
up to approximately 11 percent, up from 11 percent.
21
N. Kaldor pointed out that in developing countries there are
two basic approaches to the policy of economic development:
1 . to increase the incentives of the private sector for capital
41
formation,
2. and to create the necessary funds for capital acculumation through
public compulsion.
.
The first approach stresses more on the importance of decentralized
decision units, while the second one stresses the centralization of
decisions through the accumulation of a greater proportion of investible
funds in the governments' hands.
During the implementation of the First Plan, these two policy
22
approaches seem to have altered. The Plan initially stressed the
resource approach through public consumption, i.e., mainly taxation. An
Important reform in the tax system seemed necessary in order to put the
Plan into effect. But later, due to pressures from the Parliament, the
Government changed the Plan's proposals for financial equilibrium, and
gave more emphasis to tax relief measures which would induce individuals
to save more, and to take more risks through investments. However, given
the results of the poor first year implementation, the government changed
its attitude and shifted its ground towards the compulsory resource
creation approach. The tax burden was somewhat Increased to obtain the
necessary funds. Thus, for most of the Plan period, government shifted
its policies between the two approaches in search of a difficult
compromise. Finally, by the end of the First Plan Period the Government
committed itself to the incentive approach, and leaned towards welfare
distribution through the price policy of SEEs.
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6.3. Achievements of the First and the Second Flans
The growth and pattern of output during the two plan periods went a
long way towards the achievement of the main objectives of the Plans. The
Turkish economy became more modern and industrialized, and its dependence
on foreign resources remained relatively small. In general, the current
account deficit of the balance of payments did not exceed 2 percent of
GNP.(A comparison of this 2 percent figure to pre-plan period shows us
that in 1960, the current account deficit as a percentage of GNP was
1.96, 2.35 in 1961 and 3.1 in 1962) The growth of the economy
accelerated substantially; the GDP growth rate was not far from the
target, averaging 6.4 percent per year. The public sector expanded its
share of investment to about 53 percent, compared with about 47
percent during the 1950s. Investment expenditure amounted to 16.2
percent of GDP during the Second Plan (compared with an 18.3 percent
target) and to 19.3 percent of GDP during the Second Plan (compared with
21.3 percent). These percentages compared to pre-planned period show a
marked increase. (Investment expenditures amounted to 14.8 percent of
GDP during the 1958-62 period) Sectoral allocation of investment followed
the Plan priorities with investment in industry representing 35 percent
of total investment during the two Plan periods, in housing 21 percent,
in transport 16 percent and investment in agriculture 14 percent.
However, in both Plans the shares in investment in housing and industry
exceeded their targets, while the share of investment in the social
sector fell short of its target. The pattern of growth was
substantially different from the expected one with significantly
slower growth than expected in the sectors producing goods and faster
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growth in services and housing. (For a summary of these conclusions, see
Chart 1)
The first two Five-Year Plans were theoretically in favor of labor
intensive techniques, but the development policies actually implemented
resulted in the use of capital intensive techniques and created much less
employment than had been expected. The use of capital intensive
techniques was mostly due to the overvalued domestic relative to foreign
currency which made the imports of capital goods and machinery less
expensive. Although the distribution of income may have become more
unequal due to the increases in urban employment and emigration
of workers, social and health conditions improved substantially in this
period (see chapter 1 section 2)
.
Although various governments have shown substantial concern for
regional development, there still is much more to be done. The distribu-
tion of income among persons is considerably more unequal than among
regions, and also deteriorated as a result of the pattern and distribu-
tion of growth.
TABLE 14
INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1963-73
$ of A flf_ income
households 1963 1968 1973
Poorest
2nd 20 percent
3rd 20 percent
4th 20 percent
Richest 20 percent
Gini coefficient
Source: William Hale, The Political and. Economic Development oil Modern
Turkey . (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 137
4.5 3.0 3.5
8.5 7.0 8.0
11.5 10.0 12.5
18.5 20.0 19.5
57.5 60.0 56.5
0.55 0.56 0.51
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CHART 1
TARGETS AND ACHI EVEMENTS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND
DEVELOPMENT PLANS
F "«T PLAN SECOND PLAN
1963-1967 1968-1972
A. SECTORAL GROWTH
(average yearly growth rates)
\
Actual
Target
agrlcul-industry services
Cure
2:
agrlcul-industry services
ture
1001
r
>
Agriculture
01
Industry
Other
Services
Housing
30.9
_u_
11*2
31.7
B. FIXED INVESTMENT STRUCTURE
I
Agriculture
Industry
Other
Services
Housing
15.2
34.1
32.8
17.9
t
37.1
30.4
20.3
targer actual target actual target actual target actual
2C|-
III
in
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H
C. CONSUMPTION-SAVINGS GROWTH
(average yearly growth rates)
Actual \_
Target |~
Consumption National
Savings
Consumption National
Savings
SOURCE : World Bank, TURKEY, 1975
-20*
15*
- 101
- 51
01
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Table 14 3hows the percentage of total personal disposable income
earned by the poorest 20 percent of households, proceeding up the scale
in groups of 20 percent. The most important feature of the table
immediately apparent is that income distribution is obviously lopsided.
The richest 20 percent of households earned over half of the total income
and were, individually, between 13 and 20 times better off than the
23
poorest 20 percent. Also a World Bank study concludes that the top 10
percent of the population receives at least 40 percent of income in
24
Turkey, while the bottom 40 percent receives no more than 11.5 percent.
Rapid industrialization led to substantial structural changes in
the economy : the share of agriculture in GDP (at current factor cost)
declined from about 48 percent in 1950 to about 28 percent in 1972, the
share of industry increased from 13 percent to 23 percent, and that of
services from 39 percent to 49 percent (see Chart 2). The growth in both
industry and manufacturing accelerated during the period of planned
economy with industry up from 5.3 percent during 1950-62 to 11.3 percent
during 1963-72, and manufacturing up from 7.6 percent during 1950-52 to
25
13.3 percent during 1963-72. This rather remarkable growth in these
two sectors was due to accelerated investment which was encouraged by
genereous incentives and by continued import substitution under heavy
protection.
Also Table 16 presents the basic income distribution statistics
emerging from the 1973 survey when the total distribution is disag-
gragated into regional subdistributions. The mean income in the three big
cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir) is 60 percent higher than the economy
wide-average. "Given that non-agricultural incomes are underestimated in
the survey, it is probable that mean income in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara
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is close to twice as high as economy-wide average income."
TABLE 15
PER CAPITA INCOMES IN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY
1950-1973 (TL Current prices)
agriculture industry per capita
K ratio
1950
1963
1968
1973
306
1,133
1,449
3,442
930
3,767
5,668
12,868
3.04
3.32
3.91
3.74
Source
:
.
of Income
, a, 1980 p. 96
Regions
TABLE 16
INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY REGIONS
1973
no. of population Income mean gini
households shares(J) shares income coefficient
Big cities 989,472
Central
Anatolia 1,202,690
Black Sea 998,595
Agean-
Marmara 1,589,296
Mediter-
ranean 1,045,062
Eastern
Anatolia 1,009,843
14.5 22.4 36,413 0.45
17.6
14.6
18.3
16.0
25,487
26 ,843
0.48
0.53
23.3 21.0 22,154 0.57
15.3 13.3 21,422 0.57
14.8 10.0 16,670 0.51
Source: Structure of Income
, ill IurJC£y_,p.113
6.4. The Third Plan Period 1973-1977
27
The analysis of the major problems faced by the Turkish economy in
the development strategy and in the Third Plan constitutes a progress
from the previous plans and strategies in the sense that it is more
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comprehensive and based on broader and more consistent statistical
information. The planning techniques used in the preparation of the Third
Plan also constitute a notable technical improvement in terms of model
building and data collection.
The Third Plan maeroeconomic projections are based on a Harrod-Domar
model incorporating an input-output matrix for thirty seven sectors and
sub-sectors, including twenty-four industrial subsectors. The matrix
coefficients are derived from a detailed input-output analysis of the
Turkish economy for 1967 and have been adjusted to account for techno-
logical changes between 1967 and 1972 and the 1970 devaluation. Starting
from exogeneous target values of GDP factor cost
,
level and distribution
of exports, and the amount of the factor income, and net foreign capital
for the terminal year, the model determines sectoral levels of production,
investment allocation, public and private savings requirements and import
requirements. The target growth rates of the model are based on the
solutions of a fifteen year programming model used to bring out the
implications of variations in strategy and to determine the long run
development strategy for the country. Import substitution is obtained as
the difference between import requirements of the targeted growth and the
exogeneous capacity to import (net foreign capital + net factor income +
exports). Public savings is obtained as the residual difference between
total investment and private and foreign savings.
The Third Plan Maeroeconomic Targets
The maeroeconomic targets of the Third Plan period represent the
first stage of the long term objectives of Turkey. The target growth rate
for the GDP averaged 7.9 percent per year. The total volume of fixed
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investment in GDP was expected to increase by an average of 23.4 percent
of the GDP to TL 291 billion in 1971 prices, which consisted of TL
158 billion of public fixed investment, TL 153 billion of private fixed
investment and TL 10 billion of additional stocks. Also as Table 17 shows
the Plan's savings target which implies a marginal savings ratio of 38
percent during this period. Domestic consumption was projected to rise at
6.3 percent per year ( 8 percent public and 5.9 percent private)
corresponding to a 3.9 percent rise in per capita consumption per year.
These targets originally represented a substantial acceleration of growth
and effort with GNP rising from 7.1 percent per year in the Second Plan
period to 7.9 percent in the Third Plan period, the national savings rate
to GNP increasing from 18.2 percent to 23.3 percent, and fixed investments
increasing from 19.3 percent to 23.4 percent of GDP.
The Plan emphasized policies that would help to increase the share
of the industry in GDP to 26.8 percent in 1977 compared to 22.8 percent
in 1972, and reduce the share of agriculture to 23.4 percent compared
with 27.8 percent in 1972. To pursue this pattern of growth important
changes were planned in the allocation of investment with large emphasis
on industrial investment (45.4 percent of the total compared to 37«1
percent of the Second Plan).
To decrease the dependence on foreign resources, the Plan aimed at
reducing gross public capital inflow from $ 304 million in 1972 to $ 130
million in 1977, and in fact, to achieve a negative net inflow in 1977.
The Plan did not attain this target, though, due largely to unexpected
four-fold increase in oil prices in 1973-1974. Commodity exports were
expected to increase at 9.4 percent a year and commodity exports at 7.1
percent (compared to 13.4 percent and 6.4 percent respectively in the
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Second Plan in constant prices). The structure of exports was assumed to
change considerably, the share of industrial exports rising from 26.8
percent in 1972 to 42 percent in 1977. Workers' remittances, estimated by
the Plan at $ 600 million in 1977 (at 1971 prices), and higher net
receipts from tourism would close the gap of current account balance.
TABLE 17
THIRD PLAN TARGETS 1/
(in percentage)
Sectoral growth rates : Consumption growth :
Agriculture 3.7 Public 8 .0
Industry 11.2 Private 5.9
Construction 11.9 Total 6.3
Transport 8.2
Housing 5.0 National Savings :
Services 7.1 Yearly growth rate 13.6
GDP Factor Cost 7.5 As % of GNP 23.3
GDP market prices 7.9 Marginal savings rate 38.0
Fixed Investment
Structure Ownership
Agriculture 11.7 Public 56
.3
Industry 45.4 Private 43 .7
Transport 14.5 Total 100.0
Housing 15.7 As % of GDP (average
Social sector 6.4 in Plan period) 23.4
Other services 6.3
Total 100.0
Source: The Third Five Year Plan, SPO, Ankara: 1973
1/ percentages given here refer to yearly growth rates unless otherwise
noted.
While the Third Plan aimed at reaching full-employment as a long
term goal, the pattern of development was expected to lead to a
deterioration of the employment situation in the urban areas. The Plan
emphasized investment in high growth and relatively less labor-intensive
industries; the consequent increase in the level of unemployment in the
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medium- term was seen and accepted as a price worth paying for immediate
rapid growth with full-employment expected after 1995. Thus, the State
Planning Organization expected the level of disguised and open unemploy-
ment outside agriculture to grow from 14.5 percent of the non-agri-
cultural labor force in 1973 to 14.9 percent in 1977, and 15.4 percent in
1987.
The policies proposed in the Third Plan aimed at reaching its
targets while maintaining price stability. To counteract short term
fluctuations in growth, maintaining flexibility in the level of public
expenditure and in the determination of tax rates were proposed.
To accelerate the growth of industrial exports, policies were
adopted to simplify tax rebate procedures and to help widen the foreign
markets for these products. Import requirements of the proposed
development targets were found to exceed the independently projected
foreign exchange receipts. Consequently, a large volume of import
substitution was advocated in the Third Plan, supplemented by a policy of
import restrictions and controls that aim at conserving foreign exchange
while avoiding shortages by timely import of necessary raw material and
capital goods.
The Third Plan development strategy constitutes the first stage of a
long term strategy for the period 1973-95 and a continuation of the
strategy of the two previous plans. The basic objective to be reached by
1995, when Turkey expects to become a full member of the European Common
Market, is to raise the standard of living to the level prevailing in
Italy in 1970s through accelerated industrialization in a mixed economic
system while decreasing dependence on foreign capital. The achievements
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of the long term targets is expected to resolve the major problems facing
the economy. These problems are identified as rapid population increase
(about 2.5 percent increase per year) and its scattered settlement, the
large volume of disguised unemployment, the unbalanced distribution of
income, the insufficiency of social security coverage, limited and
inadequate health and education facilities, deficiencies in domestic
resource mobilization and the credit system, an inadequate production
structure and technology, growing foreign trade deficits, a costly and
slow functioning public administration, and the obligations
imposed by the future EEC (European Economic Community) membership.
It can be said that by the end of 1977, the Third Plan period,
Turkey has reached the status of a middle income developing country with
a per capita income of about $ 1,100 and a relatively modern, diversified
and a complex production structure. The public sector has continued to
play a major role in economic and social development since the beginning
of the planning era. It has accounted for 50 to 55 percent of total
investment during 1963-77, but its share in manufacturing investment
increased substantially, to about 49 percent of total in 1977. The
private sector has also shown considerable dynamism and flexibility.
The main goal of the development strategy of Turkey has been to seek
a rapid transformation of the productive structure involving the
development of an indigeneous, modern industrial sector, and the
modernization of the agricultural sector. This was correctly perceived as
the appropriate way to transfer technology in the initial stages, and
later on, as the economy grew more sophisticated and developed its
capabilities in terms of skilled manpower, to internalize the process of
technological growth.
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It wouldn't be wrong to conclude that In general terms these
objectives have been achieved. High rates of public and private invest-
ment, with emphasis on capital intensive and technologically advanced
industries, have led to the emergence of a modern industrial sector, as
evidenced by mechanization and use of improved inputs.
let, as Table 18 indicates, a comparison of the economic
structure of Turkey with that of an average large developing country
with a per capita income and population similar to Turkey shows that
structural change has not preceeded entirely as would be expected. The
share of the agricultural output in GDP is higher than would be expected
and that of the industrial output lower. Table 17 is rather important,
for conclusions about the implemented policies can be made and relevant
policy proposals for the future development strategies can be derived. A
low export orientation, largely due to the overvalued domestic currency,
and the import substituting strategy followed by the government together
with an import level relative to GDP which is close to the international
average, which points out the vulnerability of the balance of payments
and the need for export development. Also a relatively high level of
investment relative to GDP, accompanied by a ratio of domestic savings to
GDP considerably below the expected level, which indicates a tendency
towards a relatively high level of external borrowing and domestic infla-
tionary pressures stemming from excess aggregate demand. The relatively
high proportion of the labor force in agriculture reflects the existence
of disguised unemployment and the need for accelerated job creation in
other sectors, particularly industry.
During 1973, the first year of the Third Plan period GNP increased
by 5.3 percent despite a decline in agricultural output. The value added
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in industry increased by 11.5 percent. The imports increased by 34
percent but exports increasing by 49 percent and workers' remittances by
60 percent created a rather comfortable balance of payments situation.
The external debt was small and on rather favorable terms with a good
maturity structure. The SEEs had a small operating surplus, and the
budget deficit was around one percent of GDP. However, pressure on prices
began to emerge, and the GDP deflator increased by 21 .6 percent compared
to an increase of 13.7 percent in 1972.
TABLE 18
COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE WITH INTERNATIONAL AVERAGE
(percent of GDP)
International
Average/
1
Turkey/
3
Deviation
Primary Output 16.1 29.9 +13.5
Industrial Output 34.1 22.4 -11.7
Gross Domestic Savings 24.9 17.3 -7.6
Gross Domestic Investment 22.7 25.5 +2.8
Exports 16.1 4.1 -12.0
Primary Exports 6.2 1.9 -4.3
Manufactured Exports 5.5 1.2 -4.3
Imports 14.2 12.4 -1.8
Primary Employment/2 30.7 57.0 +26.3
Industrial Employment/
2
32.8 14.2 -18.6
1/ derived from development patterns analyzed by Chenery and Syrquin
PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT 1950-1970, Oxford University Press 1975. These
figures are for large countries sample, and represent expected values for
a country with GNP per capita of $ 700 (1964 dollars), population 40
million and average capital inflow of 2 percent of GDP. Turkey's per
capita GNP in 1977 was $ 705 in 1964 US dollars.
2/as percent of labor force
3/Estimates for 1977
In the years following 1973, this trend started to reverse itself.
There were two major relevant developments in the international economic
environment during 1974-77 which adversely effected Turkey : (1) the
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sharp Increase in oil prices in 1974 and (2) the simultaneous existence of
recession and inflation, and rising unemployment in the industrial
countries. The domestic policy responses to these developments worsened
the situation by postponing the policies needed for adjustment.
TABLE 19
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1970-77
1 970-73 1974-77 1977
Growth Rates (constant prices)
GDP
Investment
Public Investment
Consumption
Public Comsumption
Growth Rates(current prices)
Merchandise Exports
Merchandise Imports
Workers' Remittances
Rate of Inflation(GDP deflator)
Rate of Increase in Money Supply
Budget Deficit(percent of GNP)
Workers Going Abroadttotal number) 439,066
Average Current A/C Balance($ million) 109.0
Source : Policies and Prospects for Growth, W.B. 1980
6.2 7.6 4.4
10.0 14.7 6.9
4.0 18.4 13.2
5.8 7.7 5.5
6.4 11.4 17.0
25.1 7.4 -10.6
27.0 29.1 13.0
70.2 -4.5 -0.1
16.9 21.5 24.8
18.3 31.4 39.0
1.8 2.9 6.1
i,06 49,252 14,064
-2117 .0 -3572.0
The worsening of the international environment was met by an
acceleration of GDP growth, through the acceleration of the growth of
investment and consumption, led by the public sector. The growth rate of
public investment in 1974-1977 was four times higher than in 1970-73; the
growth rate of public consumption nearly doubled. The budget deficit as
percentage of GDP increased; the rate of increase in money supply
accelerated to finance the expenditures, and the rate of inflation
started to increase.
The above mentioned developments were accompanied by unfavorable
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developments in the balance of payments, partly due to world recession
and to overvalued Lira relative to foreign currencies. Exports declined
in volume and marked only a minor increase in terms of value while
imports continued to increase rapidly. During 1974-77 the import growth
rate was about four times the growth rate of exports. Due to the infla-
tionary environment a large proportion of the output produced were
absorbed domestically. Similarly, the tremendous increase in the value of
imports was due to increase in world prices, especially oil, and to
maintain the level of the imported inputs needed to feed the expanding
economy.
This time period also marked a rather steep decline in workers'
remittances, which currently finances about 30 percent of Turkey's
imports. This decline was partly by the worsening recession in Western
Europe, which reduced the demand for employment of Turkish workers. There
was a worsening of the terms of trade accompanied by attempts to keep the
volume of imports in line with the growing needs of the economy. The
government insisted on maintaining the growing domestic boom through
external borrowing, mainly short-term. The motives for prefering short-
term loans will be discussed in the following chapter. Of the total
increase in debt outstanding of $ 8.9 billion between 1972-77 nearly 75
percent of it was short-term. Short-term external debt which was $ 19
million in 1972, and $ 1.4 billion in 1975 increased to $ 6.6 billion at
the end of 1977. There are a number reasons for this rapid increase in
external debt. The first one to be noted here is the enormous jump in
world oil prices which has affected Turkey's oil import bill adversely.
Oil imports amounted to $ 52 million in 1960, $ 67 million in 1970, $
1,082 million in 1975, $ 2,759 million in 1978 and $ 3,348 million in
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1979. Also, it appears that Turkey has borrowed unwisely, using some of
the borrowed resources to finance consumption and investments of dubious
value, rather than to strengthen its productive potential. We could
perhaps add the overeagerness of banks to lend as one other reason since
this has allowed the borrowing governments to postpone necessary
adjustments. Lastly, the volume of the floating interest debt increased,
together with the sharp rise in its cost. As a result, a crisis of
confidence developed, the inflow of external capital dried up, and the
boom collapsed by mid 1977, leaving behind much to be resolved before
the economy can be reestablished on a path of stable and reasonably
rapid growth.
6.5. The Fourth Plan Period 1978-1982
As the Fourth Plan started Turkey found itself in an economic crisis
involving severe balance of payments and external debt problems,
a stagnated economy, and increasing idle capacity due to decreased
imported inputs caused by foreign exchange scarcity. In early 1978, the
government announced a stabilization program which formed the basis of a
Standby Agreement with IMF in April. The program was aimed at reducing
the rate of inflation by reducing the public sector deficit and improving
the balance of payments. SEE prices were increased, interest rates were
raised, and the exchange rate was adjusted through the devaluation of
domestic currency. A tax reform bill was sent to Congress. Also, efforts
were started to reach agreements with foreign creditors to reschedule
debt repayment obligations and increase foreign exchange reserves.
Despite the measures taken, most of the goals, it can be said, were
not realized. The progress in the negotiations for rescheduling part of
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the large commercial and banking short term debt were slower than
anticipated, and resulted in a long delay in the availability of the new
loan3 which have been expected by the government to materialize in the
second half of 1978. This aggravated the already very tight foreign
exchange situation, increased domestic shortages of imported inputs and
fueled the already high inflation. The SEE operating deficits marked an
increase, strengthened the inflationary forces and adversely affected the
international confidence.
In early 1979, the government implemented another stabilization
program. The objectives, to reduce inflationary pressures, to ease
balance of payments problems, and increase real economic growth, were
similar to those of 1978 program. Interest rates for both deposits and
lending were raised substantially. The Turkish lira was devalued, and a
limited multiple exchange rate system was introduced. A rate of TL
47.00=$1.00 applied to all transactions except for oil and fertilizer
imports and primary goods exports for which the rate was TL35.00=$1 .00.
The new laws passed permitted Turkish industrial exporters to retain 50
percent of their foreign exchange earnings and either to use it to
finance their own import requirements or transfer it to other
industrialists at freely determined prices. This, of course, created new
problems to be dealt with, such as the creation of a new parallel market,
legal in a limited sense, in respect of foreign exchange receipts from
manufactured and mineral exports. Since many industrialists already deal
in the black market, this "freely determined price" corresponds roughly
with the black market exchange rate. The exchange rate received by
industrial exporters is thus in effect elevated to a level roughly half-
way between the official rate and the black market rate. "The value to
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the exporter of that part of his retained foreign exchange which is used
for his own imports must also at least equal its black market value—if
not he would sell it. For this reason, the degree of incentive given to
exporters by the retention scheme is independent of their own export-to-
import ratios (provided that they can, where necessary, freely procure
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supplementary foreign exchange at the black market rate)". Nevertheless,
similar to one in 1978, the 1979 Stabilization program did not reach to
its goals of reducing inflationary presures, easing balance of payments
problems, and increasing real economic growth for various reasons, mostly
due to political and social instability.
The early years of the Fourth Development Period (1978-82) coincides
with large scale political and economic disturbances that led Turkish
authorities to review the system, and to change the pattern of past
policies in order to attain a stable level of economic as well as social
and political environment. A rescue package was introduced by the
government in January 1980, which led to the implementation of a new
stabilization program. The economic activities following this period will
be analyzed in the following chapters, since the period starting Jan.
24,1980 and onwards can be considered as the period of restructuring the
Turkish economy.
Before concluding this chapter, it briefly needs to be mentioned why
the implementation of a new program was inevitable.
There are several reasons why Turkey began Implementing a new
economic program which placed greater relience on market forces. The
economy experienced an extreme delay in responding and adopting to the
various oil price shocks from 1973 onwards. Price controls were every-
where; black market and the doubling prices (over 1973-79 period) were
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the rule. Ill-advised exchange rate policies had created a very difficult
balance of payments situation. " In an open market economy an inflation-
ary economic policy followed by a fixed exchange rate policy will always
lead to a deficit in the balance of payments; a situation which is
followed by attempts to meet the balance of payments' deficits first with
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existing reserves, then by official or private foreign indebtness.
"
Internally, inflation had soared to over 100 percent per annum, and
the savings in the banking system were rapidly eroding because of the
unrealistically low fixed interest rates that were offered. ( The maximum
interest rate that banks can offer on savings deposits was set by
Government. One may compare this with " Regulation Q " that is still in
effect in the United States.) In addition to the economic malaise,
anarchy fueled by external and internal sources was taking the lives of
up to 20 people per day.
6.6. The Stabilization Program; * Jan. 80 Measures "
Faced with all these serious problems at the beginning of 1 980
,
Turkey launched a comprehensive stabilization program. The main phil-
osophy behind these measures was to depart from a regulated, controlled,
and closed economy to one where market forces and foreign competition
could play major roles.
The primary objectives were to stop the runaway inflation and to
eliminate shortages.
The following policies were pursued in the realization of these
targets:
1
.
A flexible exchange rate policy was adopted in order to attract more
remittances from Turkish workers abroad, and to improve the competitive-
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ness of its products in the international markets.
2. A more realistic pricing system was implemented following the pruning
of subsidies for the products of State Economic Enterprises. This policy
helped to curb the Central Bank credits which had become one of the major
sources of inflation. Although not all, most of the price controls in the
domestic market were lifted to ensure better functioning of the market
mechanism.
3. A realistic interest rate policy was introduced in order to increase
domestic savings and to improve the distribution of domestic resources.
4. By means of strict money and credit policy, the extraordinary surge in
domestic demand was curbed, Increases in the money supply were control-
led, and more credit was directed to export oriented sectors.
5. Additional measures were taken to increase exports, promote tourism,
and faciliate the flow of foreign capital into the country.
It becomes clear that the short and the medium term policies are
mainly designed to reduce the rate of inflation, increase exports,
eliminate foreign exchange shortages, and bring the foreign trade balance
into equilibrium so that economic growth can be realized. In the
following chapter, we attempt to analyze the inflationary dynamics in
Turkey, and test whether the Government's extensively used monetary
policies would have the expected effect of reducing the upward pressure
on prices.
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CHAPTER III
BEHAVIOR OF TURKISH INFLATION
1. History of Turkish Inflation
Inflation has been one of the major problems of the Turkish econony
in the postwar period, especially during the last two decades. Although
inflation rates were lower than in some Latin American countries, during
the last few years they have reached record levels. 1/hat is more
important though, is the fact that they have been continuously
accelerating in the last decade. After relatively low levels of
inflation in the early 1950s the inflation rate hit the 25 percent level
in 1958. Following a successful stabilization program, price stability
was regained. Economic growth during the 1960s was accompanied by
reasonable price stability, with no major jumps being observed in the
rate of inflation. In the early 1970s, however, inflationary pressures
began to emerge, and prices rose by 14 percent a year between
1970-72. Following the oil price increases in 1973, the rate of
inflation intensified, so that the annual average rate of growth during
1973-77, the Third Plan years, was 20 percent. By mid-1977 prices began
to escalate again reaching 100 percent in 1980. Another stabilisa-
tion program implemented during the same year succeeded in
reducing this rate down to 35.2 percent in 1981, 28.4 in 1982, and 32.8
percent in 1983 (and in 1984 this rate is expected to reach 38-40
1
percent level)
.
The major factors behind the Turkish inflation, some of them inter-
related, appear to be the following: increased deficit financing by the
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public sector; increase in private denand with rising incomes with no
increase in aggregate supply; rapid and uncontrolled growth of money
supply and credit; an increase in money wages (initially in response to
rising prices, but subsequently resulting in price increases); rising
import prices due to world inflation;and the devaluation of the Turkish
Lira. The foreign exchange bottlenecks, followed by a reduction in the
volume of imports have also caused supply shortages, and have
exacerbated the pressure on prices. Along with these, we can also
include the sudden increase in agricultural support prices which appear
to be political in origin; the weather conditions which influence
agricultural prices; and the enormous jump in oil prices during 1974
which was financed by SEE deficits, adding several billion Turkish Liras
to the money supply.
The movement of labor from low productivity agriculture to high
productivity industry and services is an integral part of the growth
process in a developing economy. There is evidence, however, that inter-
sectoral productivity differences have been overstated in Turkey, there-
2
by leading to an overestimation of overall productivity growth. The
overestimatlon of productivity caused an increase in labor's wage
demands. With no real change in productivity, higher wages served as a
cost-push pressure upon the economy. The labor force in Turkey is well
organized, especially in industrial and manufacturing sectors. During
the previous inflationary period, large increases in wages have been
negotiated by the unions to keep them abreast of inflation. However,
during 1979, it is well known that biennial negotiations for wage
increases of 120 to 150 percent were being discussed while the inflation
was running at a rate of 60 to 70 percent.
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Also, the role of public sector deficits in generating and main-
taining inflationary pressures cannot be stressed enough. Within the
public sector the State Economic Enterprises have played a major role
in generating these deficits. The undertaking of ambitious investment
programs without due regard to the financial situation of the SEEs, the
policy of keeping prices low in the face of input and wage costs in an
effort to exert a downward pressure on prices, and the lack of efforts
to improve efficiency and reduce costs in an environment where
operating losses can be met by borrowing, have all contributed to large
deficits. These deficits increased to substantial amounts during
1978 and 1979, and were financed primarily in either direct or
indirect form from the Central Bank. (Financing these deficits was done
primarily through Central Bank borrowing. In 197t some 74 percent
of the consolidated budget deficit, and 76 percent in 1978 was financed
in this way, amounting to TL 31.3 billion in 1977, and TL 4U.2 billion
in 1978. The balance has been financed mostly through tax free domestic
bond issues to commercial banks, which are allowed to hold them in
3
partial fulfillment of their reserve and liquidity requirements).
Another public sector institution which has contributed to the
inflation is the system of agricultural support policies. Support prices
for a number of agricultural commodities are often set on income policy
grounds. The purchases made by the concerned organizations are sold,
usually at subsidized prices to urban consumers (e.g. cereals, sugar,
meat and tobacco). In an inflationary environment large increases in
support prices are granted to "protect" the standard of living of the
farmers, while prices for urban consumers are attempted to be kept
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stable through larger subsidies.
2. The Relationship between Money Supply and Prices
Inflation studies in LDCs have been based on two different
approaches: the monetarist and the structuralist approach. The naive
monetarist model was first formulated and tested by Harbergert 1963) in
"Dynamics of Inflation in Chile". Later, Vogel [1974] and Sheeley
4
[1980] tested the naive monetarist model for Latin American count-
ries. The results of their studies have shown that there is almost one
to one correspondance between the growth of the money supply and the
inflation rate. A study conducted by the World Bank for Turi<ey[1980]
5
has yielded rather similar results :
The World Bank estimated the dynamic impact of 1 percent change in
the money supply on the price level for an 18 month period. This
relationship is shown on Table 20 . From this Table we observe that a 1
percent increase in the money supply leads to a .31 percent increase in
prices during the same month. In three months the cumulative effect
reaches .67 percent. Thus within three months, half of the increase in
the money supply is already incorporated in the price level. Within 12
months the increase in prices reaches to 1.39 percent. Thus, the effect
of the increase in money supply leads to a more than 1 percent increase
in prices within one year.
However, during the following year, it leads to a deflationary
pressure on prices, and after 18 months we observe that the cumulative
effect of a 1 percent increase in money supply on prices is equal to
1.01 percent, or there appears to be an exact one to one relationship
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between the money supply and prices, when money supply is increased
exogeneously.
TABLE 20
THE IMPACT OF A 1 PERCENT RISE IN HONEY SUPPLY
months after marginal iraDact cumulative imDact
.31 .31
1 .10 .41
2 .07 .48
3 .19 .67
h .15 .32
5 .12 .94
6 .03 .97
7 .16 1.13
8 .18 1.31
9 -.13 1.18
10 .10 1.28
11 -.03 1.25
12 .14 1.39
13 .02 1.41
14 -.10 1.31
15 -.10 1.21
16 -.01 1.20
17 -.09 1.11
18 -.10 1.01
Turkey, 1980. The World Bank Country Study, 1980. p. 185
6
By using the same technical framework, Kizilyali [1978] tested
the Harberger equation and obtained similar coefficients to those
observed in Latin American studies. The success of the naive
monetarist model in explaining the rate of inflation both in Turkey and
in other LDCs has led to a crude form of monetarism where policy
prescriptions are based primarily on the control of the money supply.
Furthermore, the strong relationship between the money supply and the
inflation rate has led to the minimization of the costs of monetary
stabilization policies.
70
3. The Monetarist Model
All inflation studies start from the following basic monetarist
specification first used by Harberger[1963]
.
P=a+aM+aM -aY+aA (1)to 1 t 2 t-1 3 t 4
(.) = change in In. i.e., growth rates
P = aggregate price index
H = money supply
Y = real output
A = proxy for the cost of holding money
t = time
Here, the equation claims that the changes in the money supply
cause changes in prices, given the rate of growth of output. Price (P),
output (Y) and money supply (M) are the implicit GDP deflator, real GDP
and M2 (respectively; and where M2 consists of currency, demand and
time deposits.
In Turkey nominal interest rates have changed too infrequently to
be used as the measure of the cost of holding money. For similar
reasons most studies in LDCs have used past changes in the rate of
inflation as a proxy for the cost of holding money. In this analysis,
the cost of holding money ( A ) will be defined as ( Pe - Pe ) where
t t-1
Pe is the expected inflation. The index of import prices will also be
included in the model since studies which have used import prices have
found it to be significant even when used with money supply variables.
The import prices used in this study are the domestic prices of
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imports, including the import tax, which are the domestic user cost of
7
imports
.
IMP = (IMP e) (1+tx) (2)
d
where IMP = price index of imports, in dollars
d
e = the exchange rate ( US$/TL)
tx = average tax rate for imports
4. The Data
The annual data for the GDP deflator and GDP are obtained from the
State Institute of Statistics, National Income series. The expected
inflation is based on the surveys of the Istanbul Consumer Price
series, collected by the Chambers of Commerce, and published in the
various SIS ' monthly bulletins. The data on money supply is from the
Monthly Bulletin of the Central Bank of January 1982. Finally, the
import price index is obtained from World Bank sources up to 1968 and
from SIS 1968 to 1980. The import tax rate is the ratio of import taxes
from GNP accounts divided by the value of imports in Turkish Liras from
the SIS monthly bulletin. The study covers the period from 1950 to
1980. A list of the data can be found at the end of the chapter.
5. Empirical Results & Conclusions
Here, the naive monetarist model specified in equation (1) is
tested. This equation is estimated with and without the import price
variable and the numbers in parenthesis indicate t-statistics. The dot
over the variable indicates that it is the growth rate.
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P = -7.290 + 1.028H - 0.041M - 0.0121 + 0.006A (1)
t t t-1
'
t t
(1.81) (4.81) (0.19) (0.78) (0.39)
2
R = 0.68 D.W.= 1.59 F = 17.45
P = -6.48 + 0.959M - 0.164M + 0.014Y + 0.0007A + 0.176II1P (2)
t t t-1 t t t
(2.13) (5.85) (1.00) (1.19) (0.06) (4.16)
2
R =0.32 D.U.= 1.88 F = 20.81
The results in terms of explained variance indicate a significant
relationship. (Kizilyali tested a similar model for the period 1950-74.
For a comparison of results, see note 6).
The results show that the coefficient of the current money supply
variable is 1.02, while the coefficient of the lagged money supply
variable as well as the coefficients of income and the proxy for the
cost of holding money are statistically insignificant.
As is the usual case in most developing countries, import prices
do play a significant role in the determination of the domestic price
level. A comparison of the equations (1) and (2) indicate that import
price changes have direct effects on the inflation rate, and this
effect does not work through the money supply. The inclusion of the
variable IMP does not change the coefficients of the money supply, H2,
indicating that the direct link between money supply and import prices
is not strong.
We now test another model where the money supply is lagged for two
years in an attempt to find out whether these lagged variables have any
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impact on the rate of inflation.
P = -9.029 + 0.9937M - 0.126M - 0.224M (3)
t t t-1 t-2
(2.14) (4.34) (0.55) (0.73)
2
B = 0.68 D.W.= 1.77 F= 17.49
Here we observe that not only the coefficients of the lagged money
supply for the years 1 and 2 are both insignificant, but also their
inclusion in the model does not change the coefficient of the current
2
money supply. We get a better fit, a higher B and increased F-value by
dropping the lagged money supply variables, and including the import
growth variable.
P = -8.50 + 0.892H + 0.170IHP (4)
t t t
(3.09) (7.65) (4.17)
2
B =0.80 D.W.=1.61 F=53.02
The implications of the models tested here are very clear. First
we observe that the coefficient of the current money supply variable is
very consistent. The dropping or the inclusion of one or more variables
does not cause a large change of the slope of money supply. There is
almost a one to one relationship between the money supply and the
inflation rate. That is, the changes in the money supply more or less
complete their effect within one year, and are almost fully reflected
in price changes. (F-tests conducted in an attempt to verify this
8
relationship also support this conclusion). Thus, our findings are
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consistent with the classical theory, and support the hypothesis that
inflation in Turkey is to a large extent a monetary phenomenon.
These results are contradictory to the findings of Vogel[197t] for
some individual Latin American countries, but support the more recent
findings of Sheehey[ 1980] . Vogel found long lags in the effect of money
supply on prices, and concluded that monetary stabilization policies
will be harder to implement due to the length of time required for them
to have their full effect. Sheehey, using data similar to the one used
here, found that in most cases monetary policies had a much faster
9
impact. This is what is observed in Turkey also. According to this
analysis, changes in money supply will have a rapid effect on prices.
The implications of the naive monetarist model are quite
straightforward. There is almost a one to one relationship between the
money supply growth and the inflation rate. Faster growth of the money
supply will lead to a higher inflation rate, predominantly within a
year. This relationship also implies that when confronted with high
inflation, reductions in money supply will lead to a rapid reduction in
the rate of inflation. Therefore, monetary stabilization policies
should be very effective in the short run to lower the rates of
inflation. Indeed, at least for the last two years, the Turkish
Government has been using monetary policies extensively. It is believed
that the control of the money supply is the key for the reduction of
the rate of inflation. It is also recognized among the officials that a
deceleration in monetary growth would moderate inflation without
retarding economic growth over a period of time. Recently, in an
attempt to further bring this rate down interest rates have been raised
to increase the volume of savings. Bank credits have been made more
75
expensive (in terms of the interest rates they charge to their
customers) by increasing bank reserve and liquidity requirements and
the discount rate.
When domestic inflation is under control, the formal policy
objectives need to be shifted in a balanced way from price
stabilization to the removal of external disequilibrium and long term
restructuring of the economy. The current account deficits need to
be reduced to historically low or financially managable proportions
of GHP, while sufficient capacity for import growth to sustain a steady
expansion of employment and GHP close to potential output
levels should be developed. Also methods should be developed to
further increase Turkey's foreign exchange reserves. The development
process needs reorientation towards trade improving activities, and
requires a more effective integration of export promotion, and import
substitution under reduced protection.
Thus, Chapter 4 attempts to analyze Turkey's transition period
toward greater trade orientation. It discusses the characteristics of
the pre-and post 1980 period, the relationship between trade and
economic growth, and the effects of foreign capital inflows, and aid on
economic growth.
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GDP Import Honey Expected
GDP Deflator Prices Supply Inflation
Year (X) (P) (IMP) 00 (Pe)
1950 34.79 25.18 16.60 1.59
1951 39.18 26.96 18.60 2.02 -.03256
1952 43.34 27.77 18.40 2.42 -.02243
1953 48.39 29.17 17.70 2.95 .05465
1954 46.91 30.54 20.20 3.37 .03220
1955 51.03 33.89 24.60 4.21 .05523
1956 53.24 37.74 24.70 5.36 .09868
1957 58.02 46.34 31.30 6.87 .10087
1958 60.67 52.97 70.10 7.42 .12785
1959 62.61 63.67 124.10 8.70 .15700
1960 64.66 66.39 94.40 9.27 .21634
1961 65.57 69.25 76.60 10.03 .08666
1962 68.96 76.47 77.30 10.96 .01719
1963 75.72 80.50 78.30 12.17 .03985
1964 78.90 82.19 97.00 14.00 .06005
1965 80.78 84.57 94.50 16.43 .01368
1966 90.35 85.51 93.50 19.79 .06014
1967 93.83 96.47 101.30 22.69 .05394
1968 100.90 100.00 100.00 25.97 .05961
1969 106.89 104.51 99.30 30.13 .04258
1970 112.46 116.59 114.30 35.27 .05330
1971 122.31 137.28 154.00 43.59 .10651
1972 129.32 159.67 158.40 53.25 .18973
1973 135.05 196.72 181.00 70.53 .14572
1974 146.81 251.87 276.40 90.47 .15560
1975 159.94 292.85 319.20 119.09 .20963
1976 173.90 342.28 346.50 152.50 .19355
1977 183.81 433.82 430.19 211.97 .16435
1978 190.49 604.95 697.00 290.45 .22604
1979 189.51 1030.06 1220.80 454.55 .46692
1980 193.46 1184.57 1389.20 612.17 .57483
Sources: SIS National Income series., Istanbul Consumer Price
series by Chamber of Commerce., Central Bank., the
World Bank ( see 3.4 )
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CHAPTER IV
TRADE STRATEGY AND TRADE ORIENTED GROWTH
1 .Inward Oriented Industrialization in Turkey, 1960-73
The development policies followed in Turkey traditionally favored
import substitution over exports and industry over agriculture. The
application of these policies permitted rapid industrial growth as the
imports of non-durable consumer goods and their principal imports were
replaced by domestic production. These products tended to be labor
intensive and did not require large scale production for efficient
operations, with costs rising relatively little at lower output levels.
Thus, they were well-suited to the conditions existing in Turkey.
Then followed the establishment of some industries producing
intermediate products which replaced the imports of intermediate goods,
producer and consumer durables by domestic production. Furthermore, this
became the dominant force in Turkey's industrial development. These
industries, however, offered less favorable conditions. They required
large scale production for efficient operations, with co3ts substantially
higher at the low output levels.
This stage of import substitution, aggravated by the inefficiencies
experienced by the SEES which account for one third of manufacturing
output in Turkey, led to a decline in the productivity of investment and
raised the capital requirements of employment creation. Yet, Turkey was
able to avoid a decline in its rate of economic growth as rapid increases
in workers' remittances permitted raising the rate of investment.
In reducing the share of foreign trade in the national economy
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through import substitution and discrimination against exports, the
inward oriented policies foilowed entailed considerable costs for the
economy that were rising over time. While the adverse effects of these
policies were temporarily alleviated through increases in workers'
remittances, Turkey was not prepared for the external shocks it
experienced after 1973.
2. Policy Responses to External Shocks and Economic Growth, 1973-78
Along with other developing countries, Turkey suffered external
shocks of considerable magnitude in the 1973-78 period. These included
the quadrupling of oil prices in 1 973-71 and the world recession of 1974-
75, followed by a slow recovery. Also, taking account of the reduction in
the volume of exports due to the deceleration of the world demand, the
balance of payments deficit, roughly defined as excess foreign outlays
over foreign receipts, reached 5.4 percent of GNP during this
1
period . Rather than restricting aggregate demand to curb this deficit,
the response of successive Turkish Governments to external shocks was to
borrow abroad to maintain past rates of economic growth. In fact,
economic growth accelerated after 1973 as the share of gross domestic
investment in GDP increased from 17.5 percent in 1963-73 to 22.7 percent
2
in 1974-76
.
The acceleration of economic growth, in turn, added to Turkey's
import needs. Finally, it lost market shares in traditional as well as
non-traditional exports, further adding to foreign borrowing
requirements. These changes in export and import shares can be explained
by the policies applied. Exports were discouraged both by the apprecia-
81
tion of the real exchange rate, and by increased import restrictions
which made production for domestic markets highly profitable and raised
the cost of domestically produced inputs.
Although high protectionist measures were taken, Turkey was not able
to save foreign exchange through increased import substitution for two
reasons: the rise in domestic investment necessitated higher machinery
imports, and expanding industries required considerable amounts of
imported materials, intermediate products, and machinery. Also, the over-
valued Turkish currency made foreign industrial goods relatively cheap in
Turkish currency. Thus, Turkey represented an extreme case of inward-
oriented policies, coupled with heavy reliance on foreign borrowing in
the 1973-78 period. The debt service ratios increased from 14 percent in
1973 to 33 percent in 1977, declining to 26 percent in 1978 when
3
liquidity problems limited further borrowing. The reasons for this
increased debt service ratios were a growing bill for the imported oil,
the structure of the debt which was mostly short term, and also the hard
terms of the rescheduled debt.
4
3. The Effects of the 1980 Stabilization Policies
In Chapter 2, we outlined the main issues of the stabilization
package introduced to eliminate the shortages and the bottlenecks the
economy has experienced. Here, in this section we discuss the effects of
those implemented policies.
1. The premium on the T.L. in the parallel exchange market, averaged 50
percent in 1979, declined to 2-3 percent. Also, with increases in
domestic oil prices, totalling almost to 200 percent from 1978 to 1983,
Turkey was able to avoid the foreign exchange bottleneck that
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characterized the 1978-79 period.
2. The increases in SEE prices lowered the net borrowing requirements of
the public sector by reducing the deficits of the SEEs.
3. The devaluation of the local currency gave incentives to the export
sector and the dollar value of exports jumped 63 percent in 1981, and
even larger increases were shown for manufactured exports.
4. Manufactured exports continued to rise in 1981 exceeding the figures
in 1980 by 120 percent. The Middle East accounted for a large part of
this increase, with its share reaching 43 percent compared to 13 percent
in 1979 and 22 percent in 1980. In turn, the share of the European
Common Market fell from 43 percent to 33 percent [see Table 21].
5. The provision of low interest bearing agricultural credits a3 compared
to other types of credits helped to increase agricultural production.
The volume of agricultural exports increased at a rate of 7.2 percent per
year starting in 1977 as compared to 4 percent during the 1962-76 period,
and the share of exports in agricultural production increased from 3.6
5
percent in 1977 to 6.4 percent in 1983.
6. The dollar amount of foreign investment and the number of foreign
firms operating in Turkey shown a significant increase. [For a list of
the foreign firms currently operating in Turkey, see Table 22]
7. In response to rising interest rates, time deposits and certificates
of deposit increased to a considerable extent.
8
.
Inflation is brought under control with the implementation of
restrictive monetary policies, as discussed in Chapter 3.
TABLE 21
TURKEY'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(in millions of dollars)
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1980
Amount % share
1981
Amount % share
1982
Amount % share
EXPORTS
EEC
West Germany...
Italy
France
United Kingdom.
Netherlanas. ..
.
Belgium/ Luxeiab.
Other
MIDDLE EAST &
NORTH AFRICA
Iraq
Libya
Iran
Sauai Arabia. .
Other
United States. ...
Switzerland
U.S.S.R
Japan
Other
TOTAL EXPORTS
IMPORTS
EEC
West Germany. ..
Italy
France
United Kingdom.
Netherlands. ...
Belgium/ Luxemb.
Other
1,251 43.0 1,503 32.0 1,755 30.5
604 20.8 643 13.7 707 12.3
218 7.5 24b 5.3 327 5.7
164 5.6 216 4.6 195 3.4
105 3.o 148 3.1 189 3.3
84 2.9 96 2.0 105 1.8
56 1.9 60 1.3 144 2.5
20 0.7 94 2.0 88 1.5
654 22.5 1,943 41.3 2,690 46.8
35 1.2 559 11.9 610 10.6
60 2.1 442 9.4 235 4.1
85 2.9 234 5.0 791 13.6
44 1.5 187 4.0 358 6.2
430 14.8 521 11.0 696 12.1
127 4.4 26 6 5.7 252 4.4
125 4.3 264 5.6 323 5.6
169 5.8 194 4.1 124 2.2
37 1.3 35 0.7 43 0.7
547 18.7 496 10.5 559 9.8
2,910 100.0 4,703 100.0 5,746 100.0
1980 1981 1982
Amount % share Amount % share Amount % snare
2,268 28.7 2,519 28.2 2,466 28.2
638 10.6 940 10.5 1,009 11.5
300 3.8 372 4.2 415 4.7
377 4.8 400 4.5 263 3.0
317 4.0 434 4.9 433 5.0
205 2.6 166 1.9 158 1.8
158 2.0 153 1.7 147 1.7
73 0.9 54 0.5 41 0.5
TABLE 21
(continued)
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1980
Amount % share
1981
Amount %
1982
Amount % share
IMPORTS
MIDDLE EAST a
NORTH AFRICA 3,026
Iraq 1 ,237
Libya 778
Iran 803
Saudi Arabia.... 106
Other 102
United States 442
Switzerland 348
Japan 113
Other 1 ,712
TOTAL IMPORTS 7,909
38.3 3,557 39.8 3,678 42.1
15.6 1,564 17.5 1,310 15.0
9.8 789 8.8 920 10.5
10.2 515 5.8 748 8.6
1.4 410 4.6 411 4.7
1.4 410 4.6 411 t.7
5.6 589 6.6 813 9.3
4.4 533 6.0 330 3.8
1.4 206 2.3 357 4.1
21.6 1,529 17.1 1,091 12.5
100.0 i ,933 100.0 8,735 100.0
Source : State Institute of Statistics, 1983
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TABLE 22
LIST OF MAJOR FOREIGN INVESTORS IN TURKEY
Name of foreign firm Product Country of Origin
AEG
Atlas Copco
Bayer
BASF
Bosch
Conradi
Ciba Geigy
Coca Cola
Daimler Benz
Eternit
Fiat
General Electric
Goodyear
Hoecnst
Henkel
International Harvester
Jeumont Schneider
Kortenbach
Kulenkaiapf
Lucas
LMT
Merck
M.A.N.
Mannesman
Marelli
Northern Telecon
Nestle(»)
Philips
Pfizer
Pepsi Cola
Petrochemical
Industries
Pirelli
Oy Nokia
Roche
Reneault
Schering
Electrical Articles
Air Comressors
Pharmaceutics
Chemicals
Chemicals
Injectors
Electro Plating
Chemicals
Soft Drinks
Commercial Vehicles
Pipes and Tubes
Automobiles
Electric Light Bulbs
Tires
Pharmaceutics
Chemicals, Margarine
Agricultural Machinery
Transformers
Umbrella Frames
Tabacco Processing
Injectors
Telephone SwitchDoards France
West Germany
Belgium
West Germany
West Germany
West Germany
West Germany
Switzerland
USA
West Germany
Switzerland
Italy
USA
USA
West Germany
West Germany
USA
France
West Germany
West Germany
United Kingdom
Pharmaceutics
Commercial Vehicles
Pipes and Tubes
Compression Parts
Electrical Articals
Chocolate
Electric Light Bulbs
Chemicals
Soft Drinks
Fertilizers
Tires
Cables
Pharmaceutics
Automobiles
Pharmaceutics
West Germany
West Germany
West Germany
Italy
Canada
Switzerland
Netherlands
USA
USA
Kuwait
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Italy
Finnland
Switzerland
France
West Germany
1
Under Law No: 6224
(»)Operating under aecree No: 17
TABLE 22
(continued)
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Siemens
Sandoz
Singer
Sadolin
Thyssen
TuDorg
Uniroyal
Unilever
Vereinigte
Edelstahlwerke
Ytong
Electrical Goods & Cades West Germany
Chemicals, Insecticides Switzerland
Sewing Machines USA
Paints Denmark
Cutting Machines West Germany
Beer Denmark
Tires USA
Margarine, Vegetable
Preserves Netherlands
High Grade Steel Parts Austria
Building Sections Sweden
BANKS
Amercan Express
Bank of America
Banco Di Roma(»)
Hollandse Bank Unie(»)
Citibank
USA
USA
Italy
Uetherlanas
USA
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
International Finance Corrporation (IFC)
Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
Source : OECD, 1983 pp. 77-78
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4. Foreign Trade Regime, Post- 1 980 Period
The policy reforms of the 1980 led to improvements in Turkey's
economic performance in several ways. The large devaluation of the
Turkish Lira in Jan. 1980 provided increased incentives to agricultural
and industrial exports. At the same time, the responsibilities for export
promotion, which up to then had been dispersed among various ministries
were centralized in a new department within the State Planning Organ-
ization (SPO), the Office of Incentives and Implementation ( henceforth
referred to as TUD- Tesvik Uygulama Dalresi) . Also exporters were given
the right to import materials and intermediate inputs duty-free under the
Foreign Exchange Allocation Scheme. In May 1980, the Foreign Exchange
Retention Scheme was extended to include exporters of fresh fruits and
vegetables and Turkish contractors abroad. In January 1981, exporters
were granted income tax reductions, and export oriented investments
received increased incentives.
The Government also took steps to liberalize the Import Regime. In
January 1980, import regulations were simplified and the commercial banks
were allowed to retain a higher proportion of foreign exchange deposited
with them. In January 1981, the Quota List was abolished and about 200
items were transferred from the restricted List to the free import list.
4.1. Export Incentives
During the last two decades, a series of measures were taken by the
successive Turkish Governments to provide incentives for industrial
exports in the form of Indirect tax rebates, access to preferential
export credits, foreign exchange allocation and retention schemes, and
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temporary import permits. However, until January 1980, the impact of
these measures was limited by the overvaluation of the Turkish Lira as
well as by the dispersion of responsibilities among various ministries.
4.2. The Export Tax Rebate Scheme
The aim of the Export Tax Rebate Scheme is to reimburse exporters
for indirect taxes paid at earlier stages of production. At the same time
exporters are exempted from indirect taxes payable on their sales in
foreign markets. Such a scheme doe3 not provide export subsidies, but
only provide equal treatment to all producers as far as indirect taxes
are concerned.
There are four categories of indirect taxes which are taken into
account in determining the indirect tax content of the product. These are
the production tax paid on raw materials and Intermediate goods; taxes on
labor; taxes on direct expenses (energy, water, packaging, interest); and
taxes on indirect expenses, i. e. , amortization, sales expenses.
Following June 1979 devaluation, the basic rebate rates were reduced
and the ceiling for the application of the 5 percent of the supplemental
rebate was raised to $4.0 million, and a second supplemental rebate was
introduced for firms with annual export earnings in excess of $15
million, entitling them for a rebate of 10 percentage points above the
6
basic rate.
Table 23 shows total exports receiving tax rebates, and the amount
of rebates from 1975 to the second quarter of 1981. The share of exports
subject to tax rebates reached a peak of 50 percent in 1977 and declined
in following periods to 23 percent in early 1981. However, following the
89
modification of the tax rebate lists in May 1981, the share of exports
subject to tax rebates increased from 23 percent to 37 percent between
the first and second quarter in 1 981
.
Table 23
EXPORT TAX REBATES, 1975-SECOND QUARTER 1981
total exports tax share of exports ratio of tax
exports receiving rebates subject to tax rebates to
tax rebate rebate in total Value of Xs
exports receiving tax
rebates
1975 20,075 7,412 1,279 36.9 18.6
1976 30,768 14,434 3,117 46.9 21.6
1977 31,339 15,575 3,400 49.7 21.8
1978 55,358 19,734 2,938 35.6 14.9
1979 75,744 24,597 3,290 32.5 13.4
1980 230,730 55,030 4,905 23.9 8.9
1981
First Quart. 96,199.1 22,242.0 1,841.0 23.1 8.3
Second Quart. 96, 351 .4 35,877.2 3,489.0 37.2 9.7
Source : Central Bank Quarterly Publications, Sept. 1981 p. 59
4.3. The Export Credit Scheme
Industrial exporters may have access to export credits through two
different channels: (i) in cases when a firm does not hold a letter of
credit for its prospective export transaction, it may apply to TUD to
obtain an Export Encouragement Certificate upon making an export pledge,
and then turn to a commercial bank for obtaining the credit; and (ii) in
cases when a firm holds such a letter of credit, it may apply directly to
the commercial bank. The credit limit and the conditions of the export
credit are determined differently under each alternative.
Credit Limits: In the case of requests submitted to TUD for credits for
90
Certificate, the credit limit is determined by the use of two methods.
(i) evaluation at cost; where the relevant indicator is the production
cost in terms of domestic currency, and (ii) export price evaluation,
with the f.o.b. price in dollar terms as the relevant measure. In the
case of evaluation at cost, the credit limit is calculated at 80 percent
of the value of the transaction for all products. In the case of export
price evaluation, the credit limit is calculated at 80 percent of the
value of the transaction for products such as non-electrical machinery
and transport equipment; and 70 percent for products such as food
7
processing and chemicals.
The credit limit for the certificate is then set according to the
type of evaluation. For firm3 exporting more than $15 million per year,
the credit limit is determined according to evaluation at cost, and set
at 90 percent of the value of the transaction; and in the case of
requests submitted directly to commercial banks for export credits
without Certificate, the credit limit is set in principle at 100 percent
of the amount of the letter of credit, although banks do not exceed 80
percent of this amount in practice.
The term of export credits is up to 8 months, but firm3 may request
an extension of the term to 12 months. In cases where at least 60
percent of the export pledge has been fullfilled, extension is granted in
most instances. However, in cases where the realization rate is lower,
extention is granted only under special conditions. Defaults are
penalized by an increase in the interest rate
,
the imposition of stamp
and other duties.
In early 1 982 , a sharp Increase in the use of export credit facility
has been observed. According to TUD officials, total export credit given,
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both with and without Certificate, amounted to TL 83 billion at the end
of May 1982, as against a Central Bank ceiling of TL 85 billion for the
first half of the year. This evolution generated suspicion at the Central
Bank that part of these credits may be diverted to the short term
domestic market by firms that take advantage of the differential between
the subsidized rate and the commercial rate, despite the penalties
involved in the non-realization of the export pledge. At the end of May
1982, the Central Bank instructed commercial banks to stop the processing
of applications for export credits and to start inquiries about
8
applicants without previous export performance records. The temporary
freeze on export credits imposed by the Central Bank was lifted at the
9
end of June 1982.
4.4. The Foreign Exchange Allocation Scheme
The foreign exchange allocation scheme ensures priority access to
foreign exchange for exporters who already have obtained an export
credit with or without certificate and to exporters who do not have an
export credit, but make an export pledge to TUD. Since January 1980, the
allocation can be used for the duty-free importation of raw, intermediate
and packaging materials in export production, as well as for duty-free
inclusive importation of equipment destined for reinsuring specific
bottlenecks encountered in production for export. However, the total
amount of the foreign exchange allocation may not exceed 60 percent of
the f.o.b. value of the export pledge.
The export pledges are evaluated by TUD to determine their foreign
exchange content. Since May 1981, a distinction has been made between
projects with a foreign exchange content of less than 60 percent, and
projects with import content higher than 60 percent, for which an in-debt
analysis is carried out.
Upon receiving an Encouragement Certificate, which determines the
amount of foreign exchange to be allocated to their project, exporters
apply to the Ministry of Commerce for a Foreign Exchange permit, which
has to be delivered within four months of the application, but is
obtained usually within one or two week3. Under the 1 980 reform, import-
ation had to be completed within four months following the receipt of the
permit. Since Hay 1981, the realization period has been extended to six
month3. If the importation is not completed within this period, the
Ministry of Commerce may extend it by another six months upon delivery of
a new Certificate by TUD.
The Encouragement Certificate, together with the Domestic Product-
ion Certificate, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Technology, also
allows exporters to import machinery and equipment that is not included
on the Liberalization lists.
Since May 1981, firms that have received an export credit and have
fulfilled their pledge within a 12 month period may, within four month3
of the completition of their pledge, apply to TUD for a foreign exchange
allocation corresponding to the raw, auxiliary, and packaging materials
used for the realization of that export. This allocation
represents 80 percent of the f.o.b. value of pledge and entitles the
exporters to import at most 50 percent duty-free for further use for its
future exports, the remaining 50 percent corresponding to imports
inclusive of duty.
The foreign exchange allocations are subject to a ceiling which was
increased from $11 million in 1970 to $170 million in 1979, but declined
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to $147 million in 1980. During the 1970-80 period, allocations of
foreign exchange represented an average of 89 percent of the ceiling,
10
while foreign exchange used represented 81 percent of the allocations.
Along with these above mentioned export incentives, we should also
shortly discuss the Foreign Exchange Retention Scheme and Income Tax
Reduction for exporters.
Foreign Exchange Retention Scheme : Prior to 1979, exporters had access
to 25 percent of their net foreign exchange earnings to import, subject
to the relevant customs duties, intermediate inputs and equipment used in
export production. In April 1979, the foreign exchange allocation was
raised to 50 percent of net exchange earnings, and exporters were allowed
to transfer these rights to their suppliers. Also in May 1980, the
Scheme was extended to include Turkish contractors abroad. At the same
time, exporters were allowed to transfer their rights not only to their
own suppliers but also to any industrial user.
Income Tax Reduction for Exporters: Since 1981, industrial exporters with
annual export revenues in excess of $250,000 have been allowed to deduct
up to 20 percent of their annual export revenue from taxable income
during the first year. In subsequent years, the deduction is 15 percent
of the original amount, 30 percent on increments in exports. Foreign
exchange earnings of the construction companies abroad are fully exempted
from the income tax.
4.5. The Import Regime
Since the end of 1950's Turkey has followed an import substitution
strategy which has provided considerable protection to domestic industry
through a sy3tem of import licensing, import quotas, and restricted
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access to foreign exchange, in addition to tariffs. The tariff rates
applied on general imports have only been subject to minor modifications
since the last revision of the Customs code in 1973. However, the
introduction and the subsequent modification of special tariff rates on
EEC imports has led to a duality in the structure of tariff protection in
Turkey
.
Annual import programs have itemized commodities under the free
import list (Liberalization List 1), the restricted list(Liberalization
List 2), the Quota List, the EEC consolidated list, and the list
including imports under bilateral clearing arrangements. Furthermore,
until 1980, the Central Bank determined the amount of foreign exchange
available for import tarnsfers, and thus controlled allocations of
foreign exchange. Starting in 1980, however, import regulations were
simplified and commercial banks were allowed to retain a higher
proportion of foreign exchange deposited with them. Reforms introduced in
1981 carried further the liberalization process, in particular, through
the abolition of Quota list, and the transfer of some items from the
restricted list to the free import list.
Customs duties on commodities on list 1 were reduced by 10 percent,
and on list 2 by 5 percent in 1973. A second round of reductions of 10
percent on List 1 and 5 percent on List 2 items occurred in 1976. These
reductions were to be followed by a series of annual reductions starting
in 1978, leading to the elimination of tariffs on List 1 by 1985 and on
11
List 2 items by 1995. However, after the reductions undertaken in 1976,
further scheduled tariff reductions have been postponed lndefinetely.
This is due to the restrictions and quotas levied by EEC on Turkish
textiles.
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The reforms introduced in the framework of the 1 980/81 Import
Programs represent an important step toward the liberalization of imports
in Turkey. However, further steps could be taken over the medium term to
carry on the liberalization process of these programs, such as the
liberalization of the importation of intermediate products and machinery.
The consumption of the imported luxury goods may be restricted by the use
of excise taxes. Additional incentives may be granted to infant
industries on a temporary basis. To the extend possible, infant industry
incentives should be provided in the form of production or investment
subsidies rather than tariffs so as to encourage exporting. This is of
particular importance in the electrical or non-electrical machinery,
machine tool and electronics industries which may be regarded infant
industries in Turkey, because the exploitation of economies of scale will
not be possible in the confines of the domestic market.
5. The Relationship Between Exports and Economic Growth
The importance of the export sector in any of the developing
countries' development plans has long been recognized. The provision of
export receipts is the most important source of foreign exchange
reserves of these countries, where, with the use of these reserves, they
can import the skills, goods and services unavailable domestically, but
needed to provide a basis for stable and relatively high rate3 of
economic growth. Most of the literature in this area has centered upon
the means of achieving economic growth in the export sector. According to
the neoclassical theory, this growth can be achieved with the application
of the theory of comparative advantage. In the modern theory of inter-
national economics this pattern of comparative advantage is explained in
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terms of factor endowments, "...a country has a comparative advantage in
the good that is relatively intensive in the country's relatively abundant
12
factor".
The literature written in this area, however, yields to rather
conflicting conclusions. While some economists see trade as the ' engine
13
of growth "
,
others argue that trade is the source of instability in a
developing country.
The traditional argument has been that the LDCs rely upon to a great
extent, primary products for their export earnings. The exporters of
these products can easily become vulnerable to market developments in
the other parts of the world. This can militate against the export
sector's effectiveness in leading economic growth and introduce a
14
significant risk ". This risk can partly be due to the relative price
inelasticities of both the supply and demand of primary products and
partly due to the relatively greater influences of non-economic factors,
i.e. weather. According to Walter and Areskoug's findings we observe that
there is no guarantee that the export sector will be a reliable engine of
15
growth.
Another study conducted by Souter reaches the conclusion that
"...there does seem to be some support for the hypothesis that export
16
sectors of the LDCs can contribute to export instability ". However,
even if there is stability in the export sector, we can not neglect the
existence of the theory of " lmraiserlzlng growth ". What underlies this
phenomena is the fact that the country experiences growth subject to some
distortion. This distortion imposes a loss, and if this loss from this
distortion outweighs the gain from growth, then immiserizing growth will
17
follow.
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These above mentioned studies reflect the authors' doubts on the
proposition that trade leads to economic growth.
5.1* The Data
Many empirical analyses have been conducted to find out the true
relationship between exports and economic growth. In the following
section, we attempt to find this correlation for Turkey. The data, listed
at the end of this chapter is obtained from the various issues of
International Financial Statistics and the State Institute of Statistics
(SIS). The figures obtained through SIS were given in Turkish Liras and
are converted into U.S. dollars by the official exchange rate, relevant
to that corresponding time period. In this analysis a 33 year period is
covered (1950-1983), and the Ordinary Least Squares technique is
employed. The definitions of the variables are:
Y1 = GDP
Y2 = GNP
X Exports
H = Imports
5*2. Empirical Results and Conclusions
18
Here, we employ the models used by C.Voivodas. Equation (1) shows
the relationship between the output growth rate and the ratio of exports
to output. The output is first measured by GDP. Numbers in parenthesis
indicate t-statistics.
AY1/Y1 = 0.098 + 2.5136 X/Y1 (1)
(0.5184) (0.622) R2=0.027
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When output is measured by GNP, we observe similar results:
AY2/Y2 = 0.0905 + 2.7683 X/Y2 (2)
2
(0.453) (0.644) R =0.028
Both results are not good, and only 2.7 percent of the variation in
output growth rate is explained by the export-output ratio.
For the same data set we now use a different regression model in an
attempt to test the output-export function in forms that are different
from those specified in equations (1) and (2). The rate of growth of
output is regressed on the proportion of export change to national
output. Why we prefer a different model rather than the ones already
19
specified in equations (1) & and (2) can be explained as follows:
When we attempt to regress output on exports, or if x dollars of
exports are expected to have an effect on output, the form of the
function would be:
AY = a + b AX
If we wish to avoid the effect of different currency units and size of
country, and if we wish to talk in terms of rate of change of output, we
would use the form:
AY/Y = a + b AX/Y
Finally, if the rate of growth of Y is held to be dependent on the rate
of growth of exports, AX/X, then the form of the function becomes:
AY/Y = a + b AX/X * X/Y
This last function includes the so called "openness coefficient 11 (i.e.
the relative size of a country's exports to its GNP) which is employed in
the following equations. Also, GDP and GNP are used as measures of
output, respectively.
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AY1/X1 = 0.1406 + 7.22932 AX/Y1 (3)
2
(4.51) (3.54) R =0.47
AY2/Y2 = 0.1388 + 7.7633 AX/Y2 (4)
2
(4.62) (3.78) H =0.50
Equations (3) and (4) yields not only positive but also much
stronger relationships between these variables, and also a better fit.
2
Furthermore, H is much higher, and thus explains about 50 percent of the
variation in output growth. These positive results can largely be attri-
buted to the structural changes in Turkish trade regime, and this count-
ry's switching from being a closed economy to an open economy, especial-
ly since early 1980. Thus, we conclude that the increase in exports has
been very effective and stimulative in the increase in output growth.
Other studies done with respect to the hypothesis that we test here
also supports our conclusion. Michael Michaely, in an empirical
20
investigation for 41 developing countries , and Bela Balassa in his test
of the hypothesis that "export oriented policies lead to a better growth
21
performance than policies favoring import substitution" reach similar
conclusions that there is a strong positive correlation between these two
variables. This positive correlation, Balassa notes, is due to the fact
that "...export oriented policies, which provide similar incentives to
sales in domestic and in foreign markets, lead to resource allocation
according to comparative advantage, allow for greater capacity
utilization, permit the exploitation of economies of scale, generate
technological improvements in response to competition abroad, and in
22
labor surplus countries, contribute to increased employment".
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6. The Effects of Foreign Capital Inflows & Aid on Economic Growth
It is generally believed that foreign capital inflows, including
aid, play a strategic role in promoting progress toward economic growth
in developing countries. Rosenstein-Rodan notes that,
"the purpose of an international program of aid to underdeveloped
countries is to accelerate their economic development up to a
point where a satisfactory rate of growth can be achieved on a
self sustaining basis. . . Thus the general aim of aid is to
provide in each underdeveloped country a positive incentive for
maximum national effort to increase its rate of growth. The
increase in income, savings and investment which aid indirectly
makes possible will shorten the time it takes to achieve self
sustaining growth". (23)
The rich countries can provide development assistance, namely aid,
to the developing countries either by outright transfers of resources in
the form of goods or cash grants, or by means of various forms of capital
aid. What distinguishes capital aid from an outright grant is the fact
that since the principal of the loan must ultimately be paid in the
future by the borrowing country, it is not the provision of the loan, but
the term which is granted, that is the length of the grace period,
amortization and the rate of interest. Such aid is usually granted by
bilateral agreements (intergovernmental loans), or by multilateral
arrangements (through the international development agencies).
Without foreign aid, a developing country during its transition
period, must provide all the requirements of accelerated economic growth
from its own resources, or from imports paid by its exports. This
requires an increase in skills, domestic savings, export earnings, and
also an allocation of these resources to satisfy the changing demands
resulting from rising levels of income. Thus in theory, foreign aid, by
relieving any possible constraint on the above mentioned factors can make
JQI
possible the fuller use of domestic resources and hence accelerated
24
growth.
Many analyses on the effects of foreign aid and capital inflows on
economic growth have been conducted during the last decade. A number of
these criticize donor countries' aid programs, and argue that foreign
inflows, especially aid, make little or no contribution to economic
growth on the grounds that will be discussed below.
Numerous essays have concluded that only a fraction of foreign
inflows has been additive to domestic savings while a large share of it
was used to increase consumption. The process of growth with a varying
inflow of capital requires a continued adjustment in imports and exports
to make the trade gap equal to the desired gap between investment and
saving. Yet, given the assumption that savings equal to investment minus
foreign inflows, as long as the effect of an additional unit of foreign
resources on investment is less than one, its effect on savings will
25
appear to be negative. The critical analyses agree that for every
dollar of inflow, average impact has been to increase investment by only
26
$ 0.11 to $ 0.77. Papanek cites a number of analysts who have shown
statistical evidence that capital inflows cause a reduction in domestic
26
savings, and that the magnitute of this reduction is measurable.
Furthermore, Chenery, speaking of Latin America notes that," aid has been
a substitute for savings, not an addition to investment. The savings rate
has decreased and there has been no increase in the overall growth rate
28
of the GNP".
Most critics also complained about the instability of the volume
of aid. There has been a downward trend in the volume of official
development assistance, although lately this seems to be changing, in
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nominal terms. A number of economists have argued that the burden of aid
should be shared among the economically rich countries equally,
resembling a system of international taxation. Yet, in the absence of a
world government with effective powers of taxing, the implementation of
such taxing would be left entirely to the goodwill of the concerned
governments.
Also, the qualitative aspect of aid is at least as equally important
as its volume. The provision of aid by the developed countries to LDCs
was primarily designed to promote commercial, political and balance of
payments interests of their own, i.e., selling equipment and machinery for
not well planned projects in LDCs, often on hard commercial credit terms,
and tying of aid to the goods of the supplying countries. The latter
criticism, aid tying, serves as disguised subsidy to the aid producing
enterprises in the donor country; if this is the case, then aid should be
shown as an internal subsidy to the concerned sectors of the donor
country, not as foreign aid. As far as the qualitative aspect of aid is
concerned, Fei and Paauw conclude that "...capital assistance alone will
merely permit a country to live beyond its means. Hence, if assistance is
to be given, there must be agreement on the measures to be adopted to
promote greater self help, and technical assistance may be required to
29
carry out these measures".
An increasing number of economists do not accept the proposition
that aid is given solely for the purposes of economic development. W.
Nafziger notes that, "...foreign aid is usually in the national self-
interest. Economic aid like military assistance can be used for strategic
purposes, ...aid supports economic interests by faciliatlng private
investment abroad, improving access to vital materials, expanding demand
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30
for domestic Industry, and subsidizing or tying of exports" . Papanek
argues that " most aid is allocated in large part on the basis of
31
political considerations" . Griffin and Enos note that "...Objective of
aid is the advancement of ideology,... how much a country lends to another
country will not be determined by its needs, but by the benefit it yields
in terms of political support,... economic aid is merely one other
32
instrument of foreign policy..." . Finally we can cite Chenery who
stated that "...the main objective of foreign assistance, as many other
tools of foreign policy is to produce the kind of political and economic
environment in the world in which the United States can best pursue its
33
own social goals".
It is true that the opportunity cost of aid is very high, since
especially during periods of chronic balance of payments deficits,
structural adjustment policies such as tax reforms, expenditure switching
policies and devaluation of domestic currency are postponed to future
periods, placing the burden on the following generations. Furthermore,
aid may cause misallocation of resources, and may distort domestic prices
in recipient country.
6.3. Empirical Results and Conclusions
The data for this study is obtained through the various issues of
International Financial Statistics, and is listed at the end of the
chapter. The study covers a period of 33 years, 1950-83. The definitions
of the notations that will be used are as folows:
Y1 and Y2 = output, measures as GDP and GNP respectively
AY/Y = annual rate of growth of output
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F = foreign capital inflows, measured as F = M-X
S = gross domestic savings
X = exports
c
M = imports, where M = imports of capital goods
We first test the relative impact of foreign capital inflows, F, on
the output growth. Here, we adopt the regression model used by B.
34
Cohen .
c
AY /Y = b/g [ F /Y + X n - M ]
t t t t t t t
The equation states that there is a positive correlation between
output growth rate and the ratio of exports to total output with positive
intermediate link between exports and capital goods imports.
Using GDP and GNP respectively as the output, the results of the
regression are as follows (the numbers in parenthesis indicate t-
statistics) :
AY1/Y1 = 0.0700 + 5.476 AX/Y1 + 1.849 F/Y1 (5)
(1.88) (2.95) (2.65)
R2=0.65
AY2/Y2 = 0.07258 + 6.0352AX/Y2 + 1.7727 F/Y2 (6)
(1.97) (3.21) (2.50)
R2=0.66
The regression results show a positive relationship between the
ratios of growth of exports to output and the foreign capital inflows to
output to output growth rate. The coefficients of the independent
variables are large and statistically significant. We observe that the
inclusion of foreign inflows in our analysis not only gives us positive
105
2
correlation but also a higher R for the model. Before we reach
conclusion on the effect of foreign inflows on the output growth rate, we
regress the ratio of foreign inflows to rate of growth of output.
AY1/Y1 = 9.0237 + 26.10 F/X1 (7)
(1.98) (3.23)
R2=0.42
AY2/Y2 = 9.4313 + 26.09 F/Y2 (8)
(2.01) (3.07)
R2=0.40
Again, the coefficients of the F/Y ratio is positive and statistic-
ally significant. Thus, we conclude that foreign capital inflows had a
positive impact on the output growth rate.
We now test the proposition that whether capital inflows have a
positive impact on gross domestic savings. For this purpose we use the
35
regression model U3ed by Griffin and Enos.
S/Y1 = 0.201 + 0.067 F/Y1 (9)
(15.33) (0.28)
R2=0.005
S/Y2 = 0.1997 + 0.0146 F/Y2 (10)
(16.33) (0.06)
R2 =0.003
We observe that the coefficient of the F/Y variable is very small
and statistically insignificant, and thus conclude that foreign capital
inflows have no impact on gross domestic savings in Turkey, or at least
their impact on savings are insignificant.
Since no reliable data was available on aid figures the author was
not able to conduct any statistical tests to find an empirical
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relationship between aid and output growth rate. Yet, we can cite Griffin
and Enos' results for Turkey for the period 1951-65, where the model they
36
use tests the correlation between output growth rate and aid.
Q = 12.5 - 0.047A R2=0.62
t+1 t
(0.011)
where
Q = percentage change in per capita GNP
A » aid, (foreign assistance)
They conclude that, "... if the percentage change in GNP is
correlated with the amount of foreign aid received from 1951-65, the
relationship between the two variables is negative. The correlation
2
coefficient [R ] is 0.62, and the regression coefficient is significant
at 0.005 level. The lag between the dependent and independent variable
here is one year, but different lag3 and different forms of the variables
provoke no significant change in the sign of the relationship. To be
sure, the gestation period for the projects financed by foreign
assistance might well vary from project to project and year to year, so
as to make any simple correlation impossible, but given ' this
qualification, the thesis that aid may retard development can not be
37
rejected".
We now summarize the regression results, and reach following
conclusions for Turkey:
1
.
Foreign capital inflows and export growth stimulate, and have positive
impacts on the output growth rate.
2. Foreign capital inflows, by themselves, do positively affect the
output growth rate, by providing more lnvestable resources, by making
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more funds available to be spent on imports that are needed to maintain
and satisfy the needs of an expanding economy, and by filling the foreign
exchange gap that limits the pace of economic growth.
3. Foreign capital inflows have no significant impact on the gross
domestic savings.
4. Given the theoretical justifications and the regression results of
Griffin and Enos, the proposition that aid has negative consequences on
output growth can not safely be rejected.
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CONCLUSION
This study analyzed the growth and stabilization policies of
Turkish economy since the establishment of the Republic, with emphasis
being placed on the measures taken following the implementation of the
1980 Economic Stabilization Program. A discussion of the major social and
economic sectors is followed by an analysis of the stages of economic
development. The first stage is the birth of etatism, and thus the
establishment of the State Economic Enterprises.
In an environment where there have been hardly any industry in
Turkey during the 1930s, the creation of SEEs had strong promotional and
educational objectives, such as to highlight the profits that would
accrue to the country from industrialization, to demonstrate the workings
of the modern industry, and to recruit and train a pool of industrial
staff and workers. The public enterprise sector is a very important
factor in the Turkish economy. SEEs generate about 8 percent of the GDP,
and provide 10 percent of all non-agricultural wage employment. Also,
their investment constitutes about 40 percent of the total public sector
investment. Their performance and problems are also discussed, and
conclusions are drawn. The policies implemented since 1980 helped to curb
many serious problems that these enterprises had posed on the proper
functioning of the economy. Xet, the future effectiveness of these
implemented policies can only be evaluated assuming that the political
environment in Turkey remains stable. It is a very hard task to predict
the outcome, and speculate on the expected results of these policies in
the years to come since political instability has been the single most
important factor that has caused Turkey to experience the economic crises
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of the late 1970s.
After the establishment of SEEs, the development process is analyzed
in reference to two time periods. In the second time period (post-1960),
the development strategy of the country is pursued in a less distruptive
way than in the first time period (pre-1960). Economic planning was made
a requirement in the I960 Constitution, and was introduced in the form of
a National Development Plan. Lastly, the circumstances that have led to
the implementation of the economic stabilization package of 1980 are
discussed.
The second part of this thesis started with an analysis of the
dynamics of Turkish inflation, which has been one of the major problems
of the economy in the postwar period. Following a brief history of
Inflation in Turkey, and major factors behind it, a test is conducted via
the Harberger model in an attempt to find the relationship between the
money supply and prices. The basis for using a monetarist model to test
this relationship is due to the fact that not only various analysts have
based their inflation studies in LDCs on monetarist framework, but also
their results, including for Turkey, show that there is almost one to one
relatioship between the money supply and the inflation rate.
The results of the test conducted in this study also supports this
relationship. They also show that the changes in money supply more or
less complete their effect within one year, and almost fully reflected in
price changes. Thu3, this relationship implies that when faced with high
inflation, reductions in money supply growth will lead to a rapid
reduction in the rate of inflation. Therefore, monetary stabilization
policies should be very effective in the short run to lower the rates of
inflation. Indeed, this is what is observed in Turkey. The price level
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showed a record decline after 1980, and inflation was brought under
control with no major jumps being experienced.
The rationalization of foreign economic relations occupies an
important place in the stabilization program implemented in January 1980.
That is, in the last four years certain policies which have driven the
Turkish economy into bottlenecks and supply shortages have been
fundamentally changed, and important steps have been taken; from a
strictly controlled exchange rate policy to a more flexible, daily
regulated system, towards a more realistic system of encouraging exports,
and towards an acceptable level of foreign debt. Following the
implementation of the new program, and the structural changes in the
foreign trade regime, exports have shown an extraordinary growth, and
workers' remittances exceeded half of the total exports, and a balance
was achieved in external payments without extreme dependence on foreign
sources.
Although there have been a number of articles which reached the
conclusion that LDC exports can lead to export instability, the
importance of the export sector in any of the developing economies has
long been recognized. In an attempt to find the true relationship between
exports and economic growth, we have run regression analyses for Turkey.
The results indicated a strong positive correlation between these two
variables, and thus supported the hypothesis that exports stimulate
economic growth. Various studies conclude that exports are more job and
wage intensive. This also emphasizes the positive consequences of export
incentives, since they would tend to raise the level of wages and employ-
ment.
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Another study in this section examined the effects of foreign
capital inflows and aid on economic growth. Regression results help us to
draw conclusions about the effects of these variables. It is generally
believed that foreign capital inflows, including aid, play a strategic
role in promoting progress toward economic growth in developing
countries. Our results indicated that the correlation between foreign
output growth is positive. That is, foreign capital inflows had a
positive impact on economic growth. Yet, due to data problems we were
unable to test the relationship between foreign aid and output growth, so
at this point of time we can reach the conclusion only on a theoretical
basis, and state that given the objectives of donor countries, foreign
aid may have negative consequences on economic growth.
We also tested the hypothesis that whether foreign capital inflows
have an impact on domestic savings. The results obtained led us to
the conclusion that capital inflows have no impact on savings, and the
correlation is insignificant. This finding is rather controversial to
Chenery and Strout's "two gap analysis", which states that the savings
gap becomes the limiting factor to growth, and aid, becoming an addition
to a country's savings increases its investable resources by the full
amount of aid.
The positive results of the 1980 Stabilization Program, which are
rarely encountered in other developing countries represent an unqualified
success. Turkey is approaching the point where it can maintain a balance
between dependence on foreign borrowing, and reliance on its own
resources. Steps to be taken in the future will clearly be in the
direction of departing from the current exchange rate system towards full
convertibility of the Lira, significant reductions in trade barriers, and
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becoming a full member of the EEC, which will make European markets more
accessable to Turkish exporters. The realization of these steps will not
only avoid the possibilities of facing such previous crises, but also to
further reduce the trade deficits, and provide a higher standard of
living for the Turkish society.
116
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Balassa, Bela. "The policy experience of NIEs After 1973 f Case of
Turney". The Role of Exchange Rate Policy in Outward Orientation erf
the Turkish Economy. Istanbul: Meban Securities, 1981.
Bhagwati, J., and T. Srinivasan. Lectures on International Traae. HIT
Press: 1983.
Bulutoglu, K. "Financing Turkey's Development Plan." Planning in Turkey.
eds.S. Ilkin and E. Inane. Ankara: Middle Eastern Technical
University Press No.9> 1967.
Conn, Edwin. Turkish Economic. Social and Political Change. New York:
Praeger Publications, 1970.
DarKot, B. Demographic Movements in Turkey. University of IstanDul.
International Edition. No. 2, 1955.
Dervis, Kemal., and S. Robinson. "The Structure of Income Equality in
TurKey, 1950-73." Political Economy of Income Distribution in
Turkey. New York: Holmes-Meier Publications, 1980.
Ethier, W. Modern International Economics. W.W. Norton 4 Company, Inc.,
1983.
Goywen, K. "The Nature and the Practice of Turkish Etatism. " PhD.
Dissertation, University of Leeds, 1973.
Hale, William. The Political and
,
Turkey . London :Croora Helm Ltd, 1981.
of Modern
"Introducing Turkey's State Planning Publication." Annara: SPO
Publication No. 3, 1963
Kizilyali, H. Turkive Ekonomisindeki Gelismelerin Parasal Faktorlerle
Aciklanmasi. Istanbul: Bogazici University Publications, 1978.
Kurdas, Kemal. Reforming the Turki sh Exchange System. Istanbul: Meban
Brokerage and Finance Corp. Publication, 1979.
Nafziger, Wayne. The Internationa
Belmont: Wadsworth, 1984.
, oX Development.
Nurkse, Ragnar. "Patterns of Trade and Development." Economics of Traoe
and Development, eo. J. Theberge. New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1968.
Okcun, G. Turkish Economic Congress. 1923 Izmir. Ankara University,
Faculty of Political Science Publication, 1968.
117
Serim, Ticur. Socio Economic Determinants of Differential Fertility In
Turkey. Ankara: Hacettepe University, Institute of Population
Studies, 1971.
"The Second Five Year Development Plan, 1966-72." State Planning
Organization. Ankara, 1969.
"Statistical Tables". State Institute of Statictics, Angara: June 1982.
Tinbergen, Jan. "Metnodological Background of tne Plan". Planning in
Turkey , eds. S.Ilkin and E. Inane. Ankara: Middle Eastern Technical
University Publications, No. 9, 1967.
Torun, 0. Tne Estaplishiaent ana the Structure of State Planning
Organization. Ankara: Economic Research Division, State Investment
Bank. Middle East Technical University, 1967.
"The Third Five Year Plan, 1973-1977." SPO. Ankara, 1973.
"Trends in Fertility and Mortality in Turkey, 1935-75." Committee on
Population and Demography. Ho. 8. Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1982.
Turkey. Policies and Prospects for Growth. Washington, D.C. : The World
Bank Publications Unit, March 1980.
TurKey: Prospects and Problems of an Expanding Economy .
Washington, D. C. : The World Bank Publications Unit, Feoruary, 1975.
Walstedt, B. State Manufacturing Enterprise in a. Mixed Economy: The
Turkish Case. Baltimore, Maryland: Jonn Hopkins University Press,
1980.
Walter, I. and K. Areskoug. International Economics . 3rd ed. Hew York:
John Wiley 4c Sons, Inc., 1981.
US
Perioaicals
"Aylik Ekonomik Rapor". Turkive Is Bankasi. A.S. . (Ankara:July
1984), pp. 22-25.
Balassa, Bela. "Exports and Economic Growth: Further Evidence."
Journal of Development Economics 5 (1978), p. 181.
Chenery H. , and A. Strout. "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development.
"
The American Economic Review 4 (September 1966), pp. 681-62.
Cohen, B.I. "Relative Effects of Foreign Capital and Exports on Economic
Growth." Review of Economics and Statistics 50. (Hay 1968), p. 75.
Griffin, K.B. , and J.L. Enos. "Foreign Assistance: ODjectives and
Consequences . " Economic Development and Cultural Change 3:18,
(April 1970), pp. 315-321.
Fei, J., and D. Paauw. "Foreign Assistance and Self Help" The Review of
Economics and Statistics 3. (September 1975), p. 261.
Healey, Derek T. "Foreign Capital and Exports in Economic Development:
the Experience of 8 Asian Countries." Economic Record 49,
(September 1973), p. 410.
I.B.A. Newsletter No. 3293, (June 1983).
Hichaely, Michael. "Exports and Growth: An Empirican Investigation."
Journal of Development Economics 4. (1977), pp. 4 9-52.
"Official Gazette." No. 14851, 7. July. 1984.
Papanek, G. "The Effects of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on Savings
and Growth in LDCs." Economic Journal 62. (Septemoer 1972)
PP. 935-36.
Sheehey, E. "Money, Income, and Prices in Latin America." Journal of
Development Economies . (September 1980).
Souter, Geoffrey N. "Export Instability and Concentration in the LDCs:
A Cross Country Analysis." Journal of Development Economics .
(September 1977), p. 295.
Vogel, R. "The Dynamics of Inflation in Latin America, 1950-1960."
American Economic Review . (March 1974).
Voivodas, C.S. "Exports, Foreign Capital Inflows, and Economic Growth."
Journal of International Economics 3. (March 1973), PP. 337-49.
"Yearly Publication, 1982." Ankara: Central Bank . (1982).
"miik Rapor 1982-83." Istanbul: Turkive Is Bankasi . (1983).
GROWTH AND STABILIZATION POLICIES
IN AN EXPANDING ECONOMY:
TURKEY, 1963-1983
by
MUZAFFER SERDAR TEPE
B.A., Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, New Jersey, 1983
AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS
Submitted in partial fullfiliaent of the
requirements for the degree :
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Economics
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1984
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the growth policies and outward orientation of
the Turkish economy since the establishment of the Republic, with
emphasis being placed on the measures taken following the implementation
of the 1980 Economic Stabilization Program. The analysis is carried out
in two major sections. The first one discusses socio-economic growth and
development patterns, where the discussion of major social and economic
sectors is followed by an analysis of the stages of economic development.
This section also covers the establishments and the objectives of the
State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and the State Planning Organization
(SPO) followed by the development plan period where economic planning was
made a requirement and was introduced in the form of a National Develop-
ment Plan, and the circumstances that have led to the implementation of
the economic stabilization package.
The second section starts with an anaylsis of the dynamics of
inflation in Turkey which has been one of the major problems of the
economy in the po3t-war period. In an attempt to find the relationship
between money supply and prices via monetarist models, the tests
conducted yield to the result that there is almost one to one
correspondance between these two variables. A number of studies conducted
on this subject for a number of developing countries, including Turkey,
also supports this conclusion. Thus, this relationship implies that, when
faced with reductions in the money supply growth, a rapid reduction in
the rate of inflation will follow. Therefore, monetary stabilization
policies should be very effective in the short run to lower the rate of
inflation. Indeed, this is what was experienced in Turkey. The price
level showed a record decline after 1980, and inflation was brought under
control with no major jumps in price level being observed.
The rationalization of foreign economic relations occupies an
important place in the stabilization program implemented in 1980.
Following the structural changes in the foreign trade regime, exports
showed an extraordinary growth, inflow of workers' remittances reached
record levels, and a balance was achieved in external payments witnout
extreme dependence on foreign sources.
The importance of the export sector in any developing economy nas
long been recognized, although there nave been a number of articles which
reached tne conclusion that the growth in LDC exports will not lead to
rapia economic growth. The tests conducted to examine tne true relation-
ship between exports and economic growth indicates a strong positive
correlation between these two variables, and thus supports the hypothesis
that exports stimulate economic growth.
It is generally believed tnat the foreign capital inflows ana aid
play a strategic role in promoting progress toward economic growth in
developing countries. Given the results obtained for Turkey, we conclude
tnat although foreign capital inflows have a positive impact, foreign aid
mayoe negatively correlated, and may have a negative impact on economic
growth. Also, the tests we have conducted to fina out wnetner there is a
positive relationship between domestic savings and capital inflows lead
us to tne conclusion that capital inflows have no impact on domestic
savings.
The positive results of tne 1980 Stabilization Program, wnicn are
rarely encountered in otner developing countries, represent an
unqualified success. Turkey is approaching a point where it can maintain
3a balance between dependence on foreign borrowing, and reliance on its
own resources. Steps to be taken in the future will clearly be in the
direction of departing from the current exchange rate system towards full
convertibility of the Lira, significant reductions in trade barriers, and
becoming a full menber of the EEC, which will make European markets more
accessible to Turkisn exporters. The realization of these steps will not
only avoid tne possibilities of facing sucn previous crises, but also to
further reduce the trade deficits, and provide a higher standard of
living for the TurKish society.
